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Miguel Schor*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE COUNTER-CONSTITUTIONAL
DIFFICULTY
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its
tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of
popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their
character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this
dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any
plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached,
provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion
introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere
perished. 1
*Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. This Article was
presented at the Cumberland School of Law in Birmingham, Alabama, on
September 15, 2006. I would like to thank Brannon Denning, William Ross, and the
other members of the Cumberland faculty for their comments and suggestions. This
Article was also presented at the Law and Society conference held in Baltimore,
Maryland, from July 6 to 9, 2006. I would like to thank Sheldon Goldman, the chair
of the conference panel, for his insightful comments and suggestions. I would also
like to thank Akhil Amar, Frank Rudy Cooper, John E. Finn, Stephen Griffin, Lisa
Hilbink, Donald Kommers, Robert Justin Lipkin, Jessica Silbey, Mark Tushnet,
Alexei Trochev, and Stephen Wasby for their comments and suggestions. Obviously,
none of the aforementioned individuals bear responsibility for any errors.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 129 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
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A SEASON IN THE APPOINTMENTS WAR
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was the swing vote in a
closely divided Supreme Court. In decisions decided five to four
from 1994 through 2005, Justice O'Connor had the highest
batting average of all the justices, voting with the majority
seventy-seven percent of the time.2 The announcement of her
retirement on July 1, 2005, launched a barrage of interest group
activity.3 The sense of urgency was heightened by the death of
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist on September 3, 2005. The
Rehnquist Court had gone eleven years without any change in
its membership 4 and President George W. Bush now had two
vacancies to fill. Although hot button issues such as abortion
5
and same-sex marriage 6 mobilized the ideological forces arrayed
in the appointments brawl engendered by Chief Justice
Rehnquist's death and Justice O'Connor's retirement, the
Rehnquist Court reflected broader ideological conservative
currents that looked askance at the growth of federal power. 7
The opening salvo was fired by conservative groups that
2d ed. 1996).
2. Linda Greenhouse, Consistently a Pivotal Role, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at
Al.
3. See Robin Toner, After a Brief Shock, Advocates Quickly Mobilize, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2005, at Al ("By midday [of her announcement], nothing less than a
national political campaign had begun."); see also Thomas B. Edsall, Vacancy Starts
a Fundraising Race, WASH. POST, July 5, 2005, at A4 (observing that the "effort to
fill the Supreme Court seat being vacated by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor had
already become a fundraising magnet for both left and right"); David E. Rosenbaum
& Lynette Clemetson, In Fight To Confirm New Justice, Two Field Generals Rally
Their Troops Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A19 (noting presciently that this
Supreme Court nomination battle might be different than previous ones because
Christian conservatives were "springing into action" and were "far better organized
and sophisticated than they were when the first President Bush named Justice
Thomas to the court").
4. Linda Greenhouse, Under the Microscope Longer Than Most, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2005, at A3.
5. A Pew Research Center analysis states: "Clearly, Americans believe that no
single issue before the court has greater importance [than abortion]." Press Release,
The Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Abortion, the Court and the
Public 1 (Oct. 3, 2005), http://people-press.org/commentary/pdf/1l9.pdf.
6. Conservatives mobilizing in opposition to gay marriage view the issue as
the "new abortion," as it is a "culture-altering change being implemented by judicial
fiat." Russell Shorto, What's Their Real Problem with Gay Marriage?, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2005, (Magazine), at 34.
7. Thomas M. Keck writes that when it comes to federal power, the Rehnquist
Court "has been the least deferential of any in the history of the U.S. Supreme
Court, striking down thirty provisions of federal law from 1995 to 2001." THOMAS
M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN
JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 2 (2004).
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met within hours of Justice O'Connor's retirement. These
groups sought to prevent President Bush from nominating his
attorney general, Alberto R. Gonzales, because they believed
Gonzales's views on abortion were suspect.8 The debate became
so heated that President Bush and the Senate Republican
leadership asked conservatives to avoid divisive cultural issues,
such as abortion and same-sex marriage, in discussing
nominations, and to emphasize themes tested in polls, such as
"a fair and dignified confirmation process."9 President Bush's
nomination of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr. dampened the
fighting, as Judge Roberts had both a distinguished resume and
a thin record on divisive social issues.10 During the Senate
hearings on his appointment, Judge Roberts articulated a
pragmatic and eclectic approach to interpreting the Constitution
that put him at variance with Justice Antonin Scalia and
Justice Clarence Thomas.11 The only real opposition President
Bush might have faced in nominating Judge Roberts to the
Supreme Court was among social conservatives. The White
House had carefully prepared for this possibility, however, by
spreading the word for "at least a year" before Judge Roberts's
nomination that he was safe on issues such as "abortion, same-
sex marriage and public support for religion."12 The Senate
confirmed Judge Roberts as Chief Justice on September 29,
2005, by a vote of seventy-eight to twenty-two. 13
President Bush's nomination of White House Counsel
Harriet Ellan Miers on October 3, 2005, however, led to a
firestorm on the President's right flank. Prominent public
intellectuals wrote editorials criticizing Miers's closeness to
President Bush and her lack of talent.' 4 Conservatives broke
8. Adam Nagourney, Todd S. Purdum & David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservative
Groups Rally Against Gonzales as Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at Al.
9. David D. Kirkpatrick & Carl Hulse, G.O.P. Asks Conservative Allies To Cool
Rhetoric over the Court, July 6, 2005, N.Y. TIMES, at Al.
10. See Linda Greenhouse, A Judge Anchored in Modern Law, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2005, at Al; Adam Nagourney, Bush's Strategy for Court: Disarm the Opposition,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A14; Todd S. Purdum, Enigmatic Record, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2005, at Al.
11. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be
Chief Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2005).
12. David D. Kirkpatrick, A Year of Work To Sell Roberts to Conservatives, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A14.
13. Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
14. See Randy E. Barnett, Cronyism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2005, at A26; George
F. Will, Can This Nomination Be Justified?, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at A23.
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decisively with President Bush over his nomination of Miers,
even though the White House and its allies repeatedly sought to
reassure social conservatives. 15 Social conservatives had long
sought to remake the Court, and they believed that Miers lacked
the judicial DNA they desired in a justice. 16 The interest group
activity revolving around her nomination had a surreal quality.
Liberal interest groups largely held their fire, while
conservatives paid for television advertisements opposing
Miers's nomination, including one featuring Judge Robert
Bork.17 Conservative opposition played an important role in
Miers's decision to withdraw her nomination on October 27,
2005.18
Miers's withdrawal was quickly followed by the nomination
of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Judge Alito's impeccable
conservative record mobilized interest groups along more
15. See John H. Fund, Judgment Call, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at A19
(stating that two close friends of Miers's, both judges, opined in a conference call
held by religious conservatives on October 3, 2005, the day the Miers nomination
was announced, that Miers would overrule Roe v. Wade); David D. Kirkpatrick, The
Crisis of the Bush Code, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, (Magazine), at 3 (noting the
disappointment of many conservatives at President Bush's nomination of Miers,
despite the fact that Karl Rove had telephoned "prominent conservative Christians.
to enlist their support" before her selection was announced to the public).
16. See Dan Balz, Right Sees Miers as Threat to a Dream, WASH. POST, Oct. 7,
2005, at Al (reporting that social conservatives, united by a "passionate desire to
change the Supreme Court," feared Miers partly because "so little is known about
[her]"); infra Part II.
17. Brennan Center for Justice, Three Nominations Reveal Contrasting
Influence of Interest Groups in High Court Nomination Process, Jan. 26, 2006,
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases-2006/pressrelease2006-0131.ht
ml.
18. See Peter Baker & Amy Goldstein, Nomination Was Plagued By Missteps
from the Start, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at Al (noting that, in spite of Karl Rove's
entreaties, William Kristol opposed Miers and stated that "[wihat this shows is that
for conservatives, the Supreme Court is so central' they were unwilling to stay
silent"); Howard Kurtz, Conservative Pundits Packed a Real Punch, WASH. POST,
Oct. 28, 2005, at C1, C9 ("As newspapers began digging out past speeches and
writings by Miers on such subjects as affirmative action and abortion, right-leaning
pundits grew even more alarmed that she was insufficiently conservative."); Robin
Toner, David D. Kirkpatrick & Anne E. Kornblut, Steady Erosion in Support
Undercut Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16 (quoting Senator Sam
Brownback's statement that social conservatives were unwilling to support Miers
because '[they had been burnt on so many ones before .... They wanted to really
know"); Jonathan Weisman, The Rift's Repercussions Could Last Rest of Term,
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A8 ("Richard A. Viguerie, an architect of the
conservative movement, said activists held their tongues for nearly five years ...
'because it was all about the courts, all about the courts.... Then when [Bush]
betrayed us [by nominating Miers], that just woke us all up.'").
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natural fault lines than had Miers's nomination. 19 The caliber
of his intellectual credentials meant that his nomination would
have to be opposed on mainly ideological grounds. 20 However, a
pair of memoranda written by Judge Alito opposing abortion
when he had been a member of the Reagan administration 21 did
not lead to an all out ideological fight, even though interest
groups on the left and the right sought to mobilize their
supporters. 22 Judge Alito's explanation that the memoranda
were the work of an advocate, and not necessarily indications of
how he would rule as a judge, successfully dampened some of
the opposition.23 His measured words during his Judiciary
Committee hearings further defused the opposition.2 4 There
was much stronger opposition to Judge Alito in the Senate than
there had been to Judge Roberts, however, due to Judge Alito's
conservative track record and his embrace of originalism in
constitutional interpretation.25 Judge Alito was confirmed on
January 31, 2006, by a divided Senate vote of fifty-eight to forty-
two, largely along party lines.26
The appointments of Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
represent the culmination of two decades of efforts by
19. See Charles Lane, Alito Leans Right Where O'Connor Swung Left, WASH.
POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at Al; Todd S. Purdum, Potentially, the First Shot in All-Out
Ideological War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at A18.
20. See Scott Shane, Ideology Serves as a Wild Card on Court Pick, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2005, at Al.
21. Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito to the Solicitor Gen. (May 30, 1985),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/alito/documents/alitodocument_060385_nara.pdf; Pers. Qualifications
Statement of Samuel A. Alito (Nov. 15, 1985),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/alito/111585stmnt.html.
22. See Jo Becker, Television Ad War on Alito Begins, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
2005, at A3; David D. Kirkpatrick, One Nominee, Two Very Different Portraits in a
New Round of Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at A26. Interest groups spent
$2,407,392 on television advertisements for Judge Alito's nomination, which, though
significantly lower than some initial estimates, was almost twice what interest
groups spent on Judge Roberts's nomination. Brennan Center for Justice, supra
note 17.
23. See Charles Babington, Alito Distances Himself from 1985 Memos, WASH.
POST, Dec. 3, 2005, at Al; Charles Lane, For Alito, a Tricky Question of Statements
vs. Thoughts, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at A8.
24. Charles Babington & Amy Goldstein, Alito on Day 1: 'A Judge Can't Have
Any Agenda,' WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at Al, A6.
25. See Charles Lane, A Right Cautious Nominee, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006,
at A6; Adam Liptak, 700 Answers, Few Glimmers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at Al.
26. Charles Babington, Alito Is Sworn in on High Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 1,
2006, at Al; David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn in as Justice After Senate Gives
Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A21.
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conservatives to remake the Supreme Court.27 The mobilization
of social conservatives has been fueled by opposition to abortion
and same-sex marriage, and a desire for a greater role for
religion in public life.28  The extraordinary split among
conservatives over the nomination of Miers illustrates the
importance that social conservatives attach to judicial
nominations. By opposing Miers's nomination, social
conservatives made it clear that they would not be satisfied by a
conservative nominee who lacked a clear track record on issues
important to them. There is, of course, no assurance that either
Justice Roberts or Justice Alito will vote in ways that please
social conservatives. Predicting how a justice will vote based on
an ideological label is an uncertain science.29 The internal
dynamics of the Supreme Court sometimes lead justices to
change their ideology over time.30 In spite of this uncertainty,
however, the heightened role that interest groups play in
judicial nominations is helping to create a more ideological and
partisan Court.31 As the current appointments season draws to
a close, it is clear that constitutional politics is being
transformed by the efforts of interest groups to place their
partisans on the Court. This Article will compare judicial
review in the United States with judicial review in Western
Europe and Canada to argue that American exceptionalism in
the rules governing judicial appointments facilitates the role
that interest groups play in shaping the meaning of the
Constitution.
27. See David D. Kirkpatrick, In Alito, G.O.P. Reaps Harvest Planted in '82,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at Al; Adam Liptak, A Court Remade in the Reagan Era's
Image, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at A19.
28. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 5-7 (2005); JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE
NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN LIFE 453-90 (2003).
29. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Changing Room, WASH. POST, Nov. 20,
2005, at B1, B4.
30. Id.
31. Professor Laurence H. Tribe recently stated that he was unable to continue
work on the third edition of his influential treatise on constitutional law, explaining
that the number of cases decided by five to four votes "reflect a... fundamental and
seemingly irreconcilable division within legal and popular culture that is not
amenable to the treatment that a treatise might hope to give to such cases."
Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 291, 302 (2005).
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THE COUNTER-CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTY,
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, AND DEMOCRATIZING
JUDICIAL REVIEW
In what has become the most famous of The Federalist
papers, James Madison argued that the new republic had a
number of mechanisms that would alleviate the problem of
faction that had undermined so many democracies throughout
time.32 The solution was, in part, to entrench the Constitution
from the channels of ordinary political change. Majorities might
rule when it came to political matters,33 but a supermajority
would be required to change the Constitution. 34 Constitutions
play a key role in facilitating democratic politics. Democracies
require the alternation in power between opposing groups.35
Though competing groups or factions may mistrust each other,
that mistrust is lessened if a constitution limits what a group
may do once in power. Maintaining the distinction between
constitutions and ordinary laws is critical for the longevity of
democracy because constitutions protect the interests of those
not in power. The political stakes in gaining power rise and
democracies become unstable when constitutions can be as
readily changed as ordinary legislation. 36
This Article argues that the trust needed for democratic
politics to function well is threatened by the recent
appointments wars. The constitutional politics facilitated by the
rules governing judicial appointments 37 have undermined the
stiff supermajority requirements for amending the Constitution
built into Article V.38 There is even less democratic protection
built into the process of appointments than in that of enacting
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 129-136.
33. "Might" is the operative word, since, as Robert Dahl pointed out in his long
critique of The Federalist No. 10, majorities sometimes elect presidents, but
minorities have the key voice in inter-election issues. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE
TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 124-51 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1967) (1956).
34. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
35. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 16-41
(1971).
36. Constitutions in Latin America, for example, were readily changed,
contributing to a breakdown of democracy in the region. Miguel Schor,
Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1,
3-7 (2006). No group can trust the advent to power of another group if constitutions
can be readily changed. Id. Constitutionalism in Latin America can be seen as a
grand experiment in the consequences of making constitutions as easy to change as
ordinary legislation. Id. at 13.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
38. See id. art. V.
2007]
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legislation, since the former requires only Senate approval.39 As
the battles during the recent appointments season illustrate,
presidents pay attention to factions that are important to their
coalition and that care deeply about the ideology of those on the
Supreme Court. The counter-constitutional difficulty is that the
struggle by interest groups to place their partisans on the Court
introduces the problem of faction into constitutional politics and
renders hollow the protection afforded by Article V of the
Constitution.
Under the long intellectual shadow cast by Alexander
Bickel, however, constitutional theory has paid little attention
to the tension between the Supreme Court and the Constitution,
and has focused instead on the tension between the Supreme
Court and democratically elected legislatures. 40 Bickel asked
how the power of a non-elected branch of government to thwart
the decisions of elected officials can be justified in a democracy. 41
Although Bickel raised the issue almost half a century ago, the
countermajoritarian difficulty remains a vital issue in
constitutional theory.42 Professor Rebecca L. Brown artfully
described Bickel's legacy, stating that "at [Bickel's] instigation,
contender after contender has stepped forward to try a hand at
pulling the sword of judicial review from the stone of
illegitimacy."43
The solutions proposed by Bickel's interlocutors to the
countermajoritarian difficulty assume that the problem
dissolves when the correct theory is crafted to explain when
judicial review is an exercise in law rather than in politics."
39. See id. art. II, § 2; id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 2
40. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
41. Id.
42. See THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
(Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005); Barry Friedman, The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Two: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson
of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman,. The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971
(2000); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Five: The Birth of an Academic Obsession, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
43. Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 531, 531 (1998).
44. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO
POLITICS 13-14 (1996) (arguing that "American constitutionalism is based on an
[Vol. 16:1
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The legal scholarship on Bickel's issue focuses, therefore, on the
internal, cultural software with which judges must be
programmed if judicial review is to be legitimate in a
democracy. 45 As a result of Bickel's influence, constitutional
theory has paid too much attention to interpretive niceties while
ignoring the problem of making courts politically accountable.46
The problem of judicial review, however, is not that it is
countermajoritarian,47  but that it is potentially counter-
constitutional.
Rather than explore how judges ought to interpret the
Constitution, this Article will examine the external hardware of
democratic checks on judicial review by comparing the American
experience with that of other successful, long-term democracies
in Western Europe and Canada. Part II of this Article examines
why the American model of weak democratic checks on judicial
review-lifetime tenure after nomination by the President and
confirmation by a bare majority of the Senate-has not worked
analogy between a constitution and ordinary law").
45. The debate has splintered over whether the cultural understandings that
inform judicial decision-making afford judges excessive discretion in constitutional
interpretation. Justice Scalia, for example, argues that the common law method of
legal reasoning gives judges too much leeway to interpret the Constitution according
to current understandings of the text. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 3, 37-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). He argues that if judicial review is to be
compatible with democracy, a more austere interpretive method that examines the
text of the Constitution in light of how its language was understood by the
Constitutional framers is needed. Id. Other scholars argue that the Constitution is
an evolving document, that the text should be interpreted according to contemporary
understandings, and that the common law method of reasoning binds judicial
discretion sufficiently to make judicial review compatible with democracy. See CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's
Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003).
46. Professor Mark A. Graber argues that constitutional theory would be
enriched by taking into account constitutional politics. Mark A. Graber,
Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and Neglected
Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309 (2002); see also Barry Friedman, Taking
Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 272 (2006) (arguing for the importance of
interdisciplinary work between legal scholars and political scientists).
47. Professor Keith E. Whittington, for example, concludes that a "'regime'
perspective on judicial review, in which the Supreme Court is understood as an actor
operating within the logic of a broader partisan regime rather than in antagonism to
it, is being developed by a range of scholars with a variety of particular interests."
Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821, 827
(2005) (quoting Graber, supra note 46, at 332).
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well.48 The appointments process for the Supreme Court has
long been politicized, but the influence that factions now play is
a recent and troubling trend. Long-term historical and
institutional changes that transformed the Court into a
powerful political institution have led to a political backlash as
interest groups vie to influence nominations. Presidents now
understand that they can use nominations as political coinage to
build support and help fashion factions. Appointments battles
have become part of the American constitutional landscape. 49
The solution to an overly democratized nomination process
lies paradoxically in democratizing judicial review by
strengthening the tools by which citizens may hold courts
politically accountable. Courts can be held politically
accountable either ex ante, by means of appointments, or post
facto, by mechanisms that provide for a democratic override of
constitutional interpretations. 50  Parts III and IV discuss
respectively how Western Europe and Canada learned from our
experience with weak political accountability for judicial review
to fashion different and stronger democratic constraints. These
polities rather understandably rejected the notion that there is
a sharp division between law and politics, and that a court
construing the constitution would be a court of law. The
American system of weak, ex ante political controls over the
judiciary was adopted because the founders mistrusted
democracy and pinned their hopes on republican virtue. The
Supreme Court is the vestigial remnant of an older notion of
politics where only the few participated because only elites had
the necessary virtue to govern.5 1 The Constitutional framers,
moreover, could not foresee the role that the Supreme Court
48. Other mechanisms could be used to limit the power of the Supreme Court.
Professor Charles Gardner Geyh explains, however, that the emergence of a
convention that judicial independence should be protected has prevented Congress
from using the political tools in its arsenal. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN
COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE 5-10 (2006). As a consequence of the emergence of
this convention, Congress today relies largely on the nomination process to control
courts, as opposed to impeachment or control over budgets and jurisdiction.
49. See David S. Law & Sanford Levinson, Why Nuclear Disarmament May Be
Easier To Achieve Than an End to Partisan Conflict over Judicial Appointments, 39
U. RICH. L. REV. 923 (2005).
50. Other mechanisms, such as impeachment and control over jurisdiction, are
seldom used in mature democracies because they invade judicial independence.
John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 977 (2002). The threat
of such constraints, however, may make courts more politically accountable. Id.
51. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC
LIFE 12-45 (1998).
[Vol. 16:1
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would play in American politics. If the framers made no explicit
provision for judicial review in the Constitution, then, a fortiori,
they did not give sustained thought to the problem of the
accountability of the least dangerous branch.
The rest of the world chose a different path because of
political learning.52  Other polities considered and rejected
adopting American-style judicial review with its weak
democratic constraints, because they learned from the American
experience that constitutional courts were political as well as
legal institutions. The nations of Western Europe chose a more
democratic political appointments process than the United
States.53 By adopting supermajority appointments procedures,
the European model of judicial review reduces the power of
factions to influence constitutional interpretation. Fearing the
power of the American Supreme Court, Canada provides for the
possibility of a legislative override of its Supreme Court.5 4
Factions are unlikely to choose the uncertain path of seeking to
change constitutional meaning by influencing appointments
when they can seek a temporary legislative override of
constitutional interpretations.
This Article argues that different models of judicial review
should be judged not according to normative criteria, but rather
from a much different vantage point: how alternative forms of
judicial review structure politics. 55 As Donald P. Kommers
argues, comparative constitutional law illuminates "the
relationship between American courts and democracy."5 6
Comparative constitutional law also opens the door to a
different appreciation of the Constitution. In an important new
book, Sanford Levinson argues persuasively that a critical
tradition is lacking in American constitutional thought. 57 One
can be committed to the goals of the Constitution contained in
its Preamble while thinking that many of its provisions have not
52. Polities constantly learn from the experience of other nations. Political
learning, for example, was an important factor in recent transitions to democracy.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
53. See infra Part III.
54. See infra Part IV.
55. Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and its Alternatives: An American Tale,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 415 (2003).
56. Donald P. Kommers, American Courts and Democracy: A Comparative
Perspective, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 200, 201 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire
eds., 2005).
57. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (2006).
2007]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
withstood the test of time. Comparative analysis obviously has
a key role to play in any critical understanding of the
Constitution.58  The Constitutional framers were men of
exceptional talent, but they quite obviously lacked the
"knowledge that might be gained from later experiences with
democracy in America and elsewhere."59  American
exceptionalism, when it comes to the formal rules governing
appointments, has not served the United States well.60 By
democratizing judicial review, other polities have made courts
more politically accountable and thereby reduced the power of
factions to change the meaning of their constitutions.
II. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND DISTRUST
The American Constitution has thus by and large remained a
constitution properly so called, concerned with constitutive questions.
What has distinguished it, and indeed the United States itself, has
been a process of government, not a governing ideology. . . . 'As a
charter of government a constitution must prescribe legitimate
processes, not legitimate outcomes, if like ours (and unlike more
ideological documents elsewhere) it is to serve many generations
through changing times.'
6 1
Scholars disagree whether judicial review enhances or
undermines democracy. 62 The most famous attempt to argue
that judicial review promotes democracy is John Hart Ely's
Democracy and Distrust.63 Professor Ely sought to drive a stake
58. George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 683 (1998).
59. ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 8
(2001).
60. The United States, of course, differs from other democracies along a
number of constitutional dimensions. See AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
61. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 101 (1980) (citations omitted) (quoting Hans Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 254 (1977)).
62. Lisa Hilbink, Beyond Manicheanism: Assessing the New Constitutionalism,
65 MD. L. REV. 15, 15 (2006) (noting that "normative responses to the rise of [judicial
review is split] between liberal enthusiasm and democratic dismay").
63. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
5 (2001) ("[B]ooks about constitutional adjudication should aspire to the model of
John Hart Ely's great work, Democracy and Distrust."); Barry Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, supra note 42, at 165 n.34
(stating that Ely's Democracy and Distrust is "one of the most extended and famous
examples of scholarship steeped in the countermajoritarian problem"); Mark V.
Tushnet, Foreward, 77 VA. L. REV. 631, 631 (1991) (stating that Ely's work in
constitutional theory was a "foil against which opposing positions contend[ed]"); see
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in the heart of the countermajoritarian difficulty by arguing
that the Supreme Court was not a deviant institution in a
democracy.64 The tension between democracy and the Court
that lay at the root of Bickel's problem dissolves when the Court
acts as a referee that polices the mechanisms of democracy:
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1)
the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that
they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is
actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority.65
The Warren Court was not, as Bickel suggested, a problem
that constitutional theory had to surmount, but instead
provided an exemplary model of how the Court ought to
function. 66 Courts should, and the Warren Court did,67 take an
"antitrust" rather than a "regulatory" approach to politics by
protecting democratic participation rather than imposing
substantive outcomes. 68  The Supreme Court, in short,
engenders trust when it facilitates democratic participation.
Ely's theory resonates deeply with core assumptions about
courts and democracy. Democracy is commonly defined in
procedural terms as a set of rules for structuring political
competition. 69 Polities throughout the world adopted judicial
review when they democratized, because courts serve as "an
alternative forum in which to challenge governmental action"
and thereby provide a "form of insurance to prospective electoral
losers during the constitutional bargain." 0 Polities rely on
courts to ameliorate conflict because it is universally recognized
that the fairest means to deal with disagreement is to have a
neutral third party resolve the matter. 71  Justice Roberts
invoked this universal logic in the opening statement of his
nomination hearings when he stated: "Judges are like umpires.
generally ELY, supra note 61.
64. ELY, supra note 61, at 73-104.
65. Id. at 103.
66. Id. at 73-104.
67. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 488
(2000) (noting that Ely's process theory explains most of the Warren Court's major
decisions).
68. ELY, supra note 61, at 103.
69. IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 50-77 (2003).
70. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 25 (2003).
71. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1
(1981).
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Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them."72 Justice Alito
also based his opening statement on this logic, stating: "A judge
can't have an agenda . . . and a judge certainly doesn't have a
client. The judge's only obligation-and it's a solemn
obligation-is to the rule of law."73
Although Ely's theory is normatively attractive, it fails to
realistically appraise either the work of the Warren Court or its
impact on American politics. The Warren Court was
revolutionary because it articulated and protected substantive
rights.7 4 Although the founders built substantive commitments
into the Constitution, the Supreme Court did not become serious
about effectuating rights until the Constitutional Revolution of
1937. 75  The post-1937 jurisprudence of the Court had a
profound influence on constitutional politics as factions or
interest groups formed in response to the substantive rights
articulated by the Court.76  Political activity increasingly
became oriented towards the judicial arena.7 7 Interest groups
sought to change the law by bringing test cases 78 and by
changing the membership of the Court. As a consequence,
Americans began to see themselves as the bearers of legally
enforceable rights, rather than as participants in a political
process that would determine those rights. 79
The political activity awakened by the Warren Court
illustrates that Ely was wrong to argue that nations are
constituted solely by a commitment to legitimate processes.
Nations are "imagined communities" whose members do not
know each other, yet share important bonds.80 The American
72. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be
Chief Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2005).
73. Charles Babington & Amy Goldstein, Alito on Day 1: 'A Judge Can't Have
Any Agenda,' supra note 24, at Al, A6.
74. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 59 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
75. There is some dispute as to the timing of the rights revolution in the United
States. The conventional view is that the work of the Court was transformed after
1937 as it became increasingly concerned with articulating substantive rights.
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson rev.,
1994) (1960). Charles R. Epp, on the other hand, dated the rights revolution to the
early twentieth century. CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 27 (1998).
76. See EPP, supra note 75, at 44-70.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. SCHUDSON, supra note 51, at 241-93.
80. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991).
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Revolution created a new model or template for building a
nation by using a constitution, rather than language or
ethnicity, on which to found a political community. Professor
Mark Tushnet makes a critical contribution to our
understanding of how the American nation was forged by
arguing that there are two parts to the Constitution: one part
which regulates the government, and the other part which
speaks to who we are as a people. 81 The substantive provisions
played an important role in the political battles that shaped the
nation. From Dred Scott v. Sanford, 2 to Lochner v. New York, 83
to Brown v. Board of Education,4 to Roe v. Wade,8 5 the Supreme
Court has never been the final word when speaking to the
fundamental values that constitute the nation. The argument
that the "Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution"
ought to be treated "as having an authoritative status
equivalent to the Constitution itself' 86 has fortunately never
had any purchase with either politicians or the public.
The American Supreme Court is exceptional among the
world's supreme or constitutional courts because the
mechanisms by which citizens can hold it accountable are weak.
Changing the constitution's meaning by replacing members of
the court is not an attractive political strategy in nations that
follow either the European 7 or Canadian models88 of judicial
review. A core argument of this Article is that although
supreme or constitutional courts throughout the world generate
political controversy, it is unlikely that factions will form to
transform the constitution by influencing appointments in other
polities because these polities have stronger and more
democratic rules of political accountability. By democratizing
judicial review, polities can avoid the faction strewn shoals of
American judicial appointments. The politicization of the
appointments process in the United States, moreover, has
eroded the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. Courts can
ameliorate political conflict only if they are perceived as neutral
81. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9-12
(1999).
82. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
83. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
84. 349 U.S. 294(1955).
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 455 (2000).
87. See infra Part III.
88. See infra Part IV.
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arbiters. If the justices of the Supreme Court are identified with
a political faction, however, the Court undermines, rather than
facilitates, the trust needed for democracy to work. In short, the
appointments wars have negative, long-term consequences for
American democracy.
LEGAL MOBILIZATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
Scholars disagree whether the appointments wars
constitute something new in constitutional politics. One view is
that ideology has mattered since the founding of the republic.8 9
The opposing view is that the Reagan administration
transformed judicial appointments by imposing an ideological
litmus test for nominations.90 This Article argues that modern
appointments wars are different because ideology and interest
group mobilization play an unprecedented role in judicial
appointments that increasingly look like elections.91 The elite
centered appointment struggles of the nineteenth century and
the early twentieth century have now become full-fledged
democratic brawls as the public has a place at the table.92
Professor Richard Davis, for example, concludes that "[t]he
transformation of the Supreme Court appointment process into
a mechanism similar to that of an electoral campaign has
occurred because of the introduction of new, powerful players-
the news media, interest groups, and public opinion."93
What are not well understood, however, are the historical
and institutional processes that led citizens to mobilize to
89. See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 2 (2005); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066-83 (2001).
It is clear that politics has always played some role in appointments because there
were more failed Supreme Court appointments in the nineteenth century than in
the twentieth century. See DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES:
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 9-10
(1999); Keith E. Whittington, Presidents, Senates, and Failed Supreme Court
Nominations, U. of Texas Law: Public Law Research Paper No. 103, Mar. 10, 2006,
at 1, available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=890361.
90. See RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION PROCESS 34 (2005); Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars:
Ideology and the Battle for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 889 (2005)
("These developments in judicial selection-the avowed and open use of an
ideological vetting process that would assure insofar as possible the selection of
philosophically compatible individuals to the federal bench-has set the stage for
judicial confirmation wars.").
91. DAVIS, supra note 90, at 105-27.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 7.
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transform the meaning of the Constitution by changing the
membership of the Supreme Court. The existing literature
focuses on the political battles to shape the Court, while largely
ignoring the role the Court plays in mobilizing citizens. Yet, a
review of the history of appointments struggles in the United
States demonstrates the role that law plays in shaping the
formation of interest groups seeking to change the law, and the
role that legal mobilization plays in transforming the law.94
Legal mobilization, in short, is both a consequence and a cause
of constitutional change.
Today's democratic appointments battles are fought on an
institutional terrain that was not designed for public
participation. Although there was considerable disagreement at
the Constitutional Convention over how Supreme Court justices
were to be appointed, the compromise that was reached made
the President the primary player in the appointments process.95
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges of the Supreme
Court."96 The President was made the key player in nominating
justices because it was thought that he would be best able to
select qualified individuals. 97 The process was designed to be
free of popular politics as neither the President nor the Senate
were directly elected. The Constitutional framers did not and
could not have foreseen that the Revolution would transform a
hierarchical and deferential society, where elites governed with
little public participation, into an egalitarian society.98
Appointments were designed to be an elite-centered process
where virtue would trump interest.99
The Appointments Clause was also designed for a very
different constitutional universe than the one we inhabit today.
The modern view that the Supreme Court is an important
94. Social movements can also seek to change the meaning of the Constitution
by transforming public opinion. Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or
Fail To Change) the Constitution: The Case for the New Departure, SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 1, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=847164).
95. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 28 (2000).
96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
97. See GERHARDT, supra note 95, at 28; THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 481-82
(Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 2d ed. 1996).
98. See SCHUDSON, supra note 51, at 11-89; GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5-7 (1992).
99. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 97.
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policymaker was not shared by the Constitutional framers. The
framers assumed that law was fixed and immutable, and that
change would occur only through the political processes. 100 The
assumptions that gave birth to Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution are illustrated in a case that looms large in the
constitutional imagination: Marbury v. Madison.101 Marbury
was decided in the maelstrom of a political battle. Having lost
control of the presidency and the legislature in the 1800
elections, the Federalists sought to retain power by packing the
judiciary with their partisans. 10 2 Marbury was a disappointed
Federalist nominee and his suit threatened to ignite a battle
between the Court and the President that Chief Justice John
Marshall wanted to avoid. 0 3  Chief Justice Marshall
successfully navigated the political shoals of the dispute, in
part, by drawing a "line, which nearly all citizens of his time
believed ought to be drawn, between the legal and the
political-between those matters on which all Americans agreed
and which therefore were fixed and immutable and those
matters which were subject to fluctuation and change through
democratic politics." 0 4 When Chief Justice Marshall opined
that Marbury's right to the judicial commission was akin to a
property right, Americans understood that these were rights
that were to be preserved by courts against democratic
processes. 0 5 Marbury was understood by contemporaries to be
an important decision that "generate[d] little controversy" 106
because it rested on the operative constitutional assumptions of
the day.
Although the division between law and politics drawn by
Chief Justice Marshall was largely unchallenged before the
Civil War, many Supreme Court decisions did arouse political
controversy. The Marshall Court was a nationalist institution
in an era when state loyalties were strong. Its nationalist
decisions led to "heated public controversy."10 7 The opposition
100. WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 3-7 (2000).
101. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
102. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 75, at 23-30; NELSON, supra note 100, at 54-
71; Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 87, 92-100 (1996).
103. NELSON, supra note 100, at 57-71.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 73.
107. DWIGHT WILEY JESSUP, REACTION AND ACCOMMODATION: THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 1809-1835, at 27 (1987).
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"ranged from outright defiance of judicial rulings to protests and
memorials against Court action directed to Congress and other
states."108 This opposition, however, did not lead to a sustained
challenge to the power of the Court. The states were unable to
ally and present a united front against the Court because
opposition coalesced around individual decisions rather than the
Court as an institution.10 9 Popular control over the Court was
largely a non-issue before the Civil War, as the Court was
considerably more limited in its powers and citizens were more
prone to ignore its edicts.110
The institutional seeds that would eventually facilitate the
development of ideological popular warfare in judicial
appointments were planted in the wake of the Civil War."' The
Court had a new weapon in its arsenal as the Fourteenth
Amendment provided important restrictions that could be
enforced against the states." 2  The Due Process Clause
furnished the Court with an institutional lever of power around
which social forces would henceforth coalesce. In addition,
federal courts were provided with broader jurisdiction to
"redirect civil litigation involving national commercial interests
out of state courts and into the federal judiciary."11 3 In short,
federal courts now had sufficient power to elicit sustained
popular opposition.
The institutional transformations that occurred after the
Civil War cannot be understood in a political and social vacuum.
Business interests were politically ascendant and sought to use
the courts to facilitate the development of a national economy."
14
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, constitutional
politics revolved around the issue of government regulation of
capitalism.11 5 Economic growth transformed American society
after the Civil War." 6 Businesses changed from being primarily
family-run operations before 1870 to larger, bureaucratic
organizations that were able to fend of regulation by means of
108. Id. at 429.
109. Id. at 435-42.
110. See Barry Friedman, The Myths of Marbury, in ARGUING MARBURY V.
MADISON 65, 68-69 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
111. See GRIFFIN, supra note 44, at 96-98.
112. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 75, at 67-89.
113. Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts To Advance
Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 511, 517 (2002).
114. EPP, supra note 75, at 45-47.
115. See id.
116. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967).
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strategic litigation." 7  The managers of these businesses
"formed professional associations and networks of
communications that allowed them to learn from each other."118
The railroads, in particular, played a key role in shaping the
contours of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the "first modern,
interstate industry that intimately affected the economic
interests of virtually all of American society," there was
considerable popular pressure to subject the railroads to
regulation, and they responded with a "systematic litigation
campaign challenging the constitutional validity of government
regulation in the courts."119
Attempts by business interests to shield themselves from
regulation were met with popular opposition as "populists,
progressives, and labor leaders subjected both state and federal
courts to vigorous and persistent criticism and proposed
numerous plans to abridge judicial power."120 Popular forces
mounted a two-pronged attack on judicial power. One prong
was directed at weakening judicial power by scholars and
politicians who questioned the propriety of judicial review. 12 1
The other prong involved two attempts to derail Supreme Court
nominations. The first attempt was by the National Grange, an
organization that played an important role in influencing states
to enact legislation regulating railroads. 122 The Grange sought
to further the goals of its members by becoming involved in an
ultimately unsuccessful attempt to defeat the appointment of
Stanley Matthews, who as a Senator had been an important
spokesman for the railroads. 123 The Grange mounted a vigorous
campaign against Matthews, who was ultimately confirmed
twenty-four to twenty-three in 1881.124 The closeness of the vote
is remarkable given that Senators were not directly elected.
The enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913
facilitated the second attempt by populist forces to derail a
117. EPP, supra note 75, at 45.
118. Id. at 45-46.
119. RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE IRON HORSE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE
RAILROADS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT xi (1993).
120. WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 1 (1994).
121. Id. at 49-50; Michael K Curtis, Judicial Review and Populism, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 313, 331-36 (2003).
122. See Scott H. Ainsworth & John A. Maltese, National Grange Influence on
the Supreme Court Confirmation of Stanley Matthews, 20 SOc. Sci. HIST. 41 (1996).
123. Id. at 45-47.
124. Id. at 49.
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Supreme Court nomination. 125 President Hoover's nomination
of Judge John Parker in 1930 aroused opposition by organized
labor as well as by the NAACP. 126 Judge Parker's nomination
was defeated by a vote of forty-one to thirty-nine. 127 The
campaigns that revolved around the nominations of Stanley
Matthews and Judge Parker are a clear harbinger of current
appointment battles.
The jurisprudence of the Lochner era, like that of the
Marbury era, rested on largely unspoken assumptions as to the
proper dividing line between law and politics. The Court sought
to curtail legislative attempts to deal with the social ills created
by capitalism by holding that they rested on constitutionally
suspect factional politics. 128 Professor Gillman writes: "The
judiciary's persistent attachment to traditional limits on
legislative power represented the final defense of a principle of
political legitimacy that the framers sought to permanently
enshrine in the fundamental law." 29 The framers sought to
erect a neutral state that could not constitutionally enact
legislation favoring factions. The master principle of the
Constitution, as articulated in The Federalist No. 10, was that
good republican government required institutional structures that
were popular yet still divorced from the corrupting influence of
'factions,' defined by Madison .. .as a number of citizens, majority or
minority, united by some common passion or interest (usually arising
out of 'the various and unequal distribution of property') that was
adverse to the 'permanent and aggregate interests of the
community."
13 0
In short, the Court sought to protect a vision of democratic
politics where legislatures could not enact statutes that would
protect or favor interest groups.
The popular opposition that arose to Lochner and its
progeny exposes how constitutional fault lines are constructed.
The strategic use of the Constitution by conservative interest
125. The transformation of the Senate from a representation of the States to a
popular institution actually preceded the enactment of the Seventeenth
Amendment. William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL.
SC. REV. 452 (1955).
126. Ross, supra note 120, at 291-93; Richard L. Watson, The Defeat of Judge
Parker: A Study in Pressure Groups and Politics, 50 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 213,
216-19 (1963).
127. ROSS, supra note 120, at 293.
128. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 101-46 (1993).
129. Id. at 15.
130. Id. at 30 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 130-31).
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groups came at a price: the politicization of judicial review. The
original understanding that judicial review was an apolitical
exercise collapsed when the Court clashed with important
political currents:
In deciding ... to protect property rights and individual economic
liberty at the expense of those who were using legislative power to
promote their vision of a just and good society, judges were seen by
progressive reformers to be engaging in a fundamentally different
activity than that in which John Marshall had engaged when his
Court, early in the nineteenth century, had commenced the judiciary's
protection of property.
1 3 1
The Court's attempt to effectuate interest-free, democratic
politics became untenable once it was perceived that the Court
was allied with business interests that sought to entrench their
policy preferences from the channels of ordinary political
change. 132 The Lochner era illustrates that attempts by factions
to use the Constitution to protect their interests from politics
can arouse a popular counter-mobilization that shifts the battle
from the legislative to the constitutional arena.
The judicial effort to protect property rights broadly
construed against popular political forces collapsed in what
became known as the Constitutional Revolution of 1937.133 The
government sought to use its regulatory and spending powers to
alleviate the ills caused by the Depression. 34 From 1935 to
1936, however, the Supreme Court held fast to the old dividing
line between law and politics, derailing many New Deal
initiatives. President Franklin D. Roosevelt understood that he
would have to do battle with the Supreme Court to fashion a
vigorous federal response to the Depression. 135 He considered
but rejected a constitutional amendment as too difficult
politically and too uncertain, as any amendment would be
subject to judicial interpretation.136 Instead, Roosevelt proposed
a plan to increase the membership of the Court. 137 Although
Roosevelt failed in his bid to pack the Court, the Court changed
course.138 The Supreme Court announced that henceforth it
131. NELSON, supra note 100, at 91.
132. See GILLMAN, supra note 129, at 148-93.
133. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 82-236 (1995).
134. See ALAN BRINKLEY, LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 17-62 (1998).
135. See LEUCHTENBERG, supra note 133, at 82-131.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 132-62.
138. Id. at 213-36.
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would provide only cursory review of economic rights while
conducting a more searching review of individual liberties. 139 By
deciding on a court-packing plan, Roosevelt fashioned an
important precedent in constitutional politics. The rigors of
Article V meant that henceforth influencing appointments
would be a viable strategy for those seeking constitutional
change.
The scholarship that revolves around the import of the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 focuses on the highly visible
doctrinal changes that occurred in its wake while ignoring the
more important but subterranean transformations that occurred
in the linkages between the people and the Court. The rights
revolution involved legal and social transformations. Economic
growth played an important role in fueling the rights revolution
as it provided the wherewithal for a number of players, not just
primarily business actors as had been true in the second half of
the nineteenth century, to participate in and fund interest group
activity aimed at constitutional litigation. 140 The judicial shift
to protecting rights, moreover, would not have been possible
without the involvement of citizens who were willing to mobilize
to fashion and effectuate rights.14' A new model of citizenship
arose as citizens increasingly became seen as the bearers of
constitutionally-protected rights. 42 The civil rights movement,
in particular, "provided a model and inspiration for a wide
variety of new social movements and political organizations"
and helped fix a "rights-centered citizenship at the center of
American civic aspiration." 143 The broad guarantees contained
in the Constitution were effectuated not simply from above by
the Supreme Court, but also from below by the thickening of
interest group activity that supported a broad array of
constitutional litigation.44 The doctrinal constitutional rights
revolution, in short, both facilitated and was supported by legal
mobilization.
139. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
140. James T. Patterson, The Rise of Rights and Rights Consciousness in
American Politics, 1930s-1970s, in CONTESTING DEMOCRACY: SUBSTANCE AND
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY, 1775-2000, at 201, 201-02 (Byron E.
Shafer & Anthony J. Badgers eds., 2001).
141. See EPP, supra note 75, at 5-6; Miguel Schor, The Rule of Law, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (David
Clark ed., forthcoming 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfim?abstractid=889472.
142. SCHUDSON, supra note 51, at 241-93.
143. Id. at 255-56.
144. EPP, supra note 75, at 5, 196.
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The Constitutional Revolution of 1937 also looms large in
scholarly attempts to understand efforts by conservatives to
transform the meaning of the Constitution. In Understanding
the Constitutional Revolution, Professors Jack M. Balkin and
Sanford Levinson argue that the conservative turn of the
Supreme Court can best be explained by a theory of "partisan
entrenchment." 145 The theory posits that constitutional politics
is no different today than in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
day because the Court ultimately reflects popular opinion
through the process of judicial appointments. 146 Constitutional
change occurs through judicial interpretation as presidents seek
to change the meaning of the Constitution by placing their
partisans on the Supreme Court. The theory of partisan
entrenchment very usefully highlights the role that battles over
appointments play in transforming the Constitution.
This Article argues, however, that current conservative
attempts to change the membership of the Court are not simply
constitutional politics as usual for three reasons. First, the
bureaucratic capacity to identify the ideology of appointees has
improved markedly since Roosevelt was president. Second, the
conservative turn in the Court is not simply a reflection of
majoritarian views, but rather reflects the views of influential
factions within the Republican coalition that have intense
preferences over judicial appointments. Third, current
appointments battles have negative implications for the long-
term health of American democracy.
The problem with theories that seek to compare
conservative attempts to transform the Court with F.D.R.'s
court-packing plan is that the analogy is flawed. President
Reagan, much like F.D.R., came into office critical of a number
of Supreme Court decisions, and determined to transform the
Constitution by changing the membership of the Court.
Reagan, however, had in place a bureaucratic apparatus, which
previous presidents lacked, enabling his administration to
thoroughly vet the ideology of his nominees. 147 The Reagan
Justice Department, through the Office of Legal Policy,
145. Balkin & Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, supra
note 89, at 1066.
146. Id. Robert Dahl expressed the view that the Court ultimately reflects that
of the governing coalition because of appointments. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy-Maker, in JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 105 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1967).
147. GOLDMAN, supra note 90, at 879-80; YALOF, supra note 89, at 7.
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articulated a view of the Constitution in a series of reports that
was strikingly critical of existing doctrine. 148 The Office of Legal
Policy also emphasized the importance of judicial ideology in
seeking to transform the Constitution. 149  The Reagan
administration established ideological criteria for judicial
nominations and then searched for nominees who complied with
those criteria. Professor David Alistair Yalof concludes that the
examination by the administration of the ideological view of
potential Supreme Court nominees was unprecedented. 150
The partisan entrenchment that occurred during the
Reagan and subsequent conservative administrations was not
simply the result of presidential politics. The modem
conservative movement arose in direct response to judicial
decisions that directly challenged many core conservative
beliefs. 151 It is no accident that "[b]attles over abortion, birth
control, the Equal Rights Amendment, and other gender-based
issues (and, more recently, battles over homosexuality) have
mobilized the fundamentalist right more successfully and
energetically than any other issues."152  Professor Noah
Feldman noted that we are a nation divided over issues that "go
to the very heart of who we are as a nation."15 3 Perhaps no
modern constitutional case played a more important role in
dividing the nation along lines of supposed good and evil than
Roe v. Wade.154 Roe "infuriated a lightly sleeping giant," 155 by
energizing a conservative movement that sees the opinion as the
moral equivalent of Dred Scott. 56 Since the policies that social
conservatives wish to change are embedded in the Constitution
148. Dawn E. Johnson, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on
Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J.
363, 390 (2003) ("[A] theme throughout [the reports] was a concern that 'activist,'
unelected judges were creating rights not properly found in the constitutional text or
structure or original intent of the framers, such as the right to privacy and the
rights of criminal suspects.").
149. Id. at 397 (noting that the report "The Constitution in the Year 2000:
Choices Ahead in Constitutional Interpretation" stated that "[t]here are few factors
that are more critical to determining the course of the Nation, and yet more often
overlooked, than the values and philosophies of the men and women who populate
the third co-equal branch of the national government-the federal judiciary").
150. YALOF, supra note 89, at 144.
151. FELDMAN, supra note 28; MORONE, supra note 28.
152. BRINKLEY, supra note 134, at 291.
153. FELDMAN, supra note 28, at 7.
154. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
155. N.E.H. HULL & PETER CHARLES HOFFER, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION
RIGHTS CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 187 (2001).
156. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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primarily by means of judicial interpretation, the solution is to
change the make-up of the federal courts. The interest group
activity that played a crucial role in the appointments of
Justices Roberts and Alito illustrates how factions can form to
change the path of the Court. Constitutional change occurs not
only as a result of pressure from above as presidents seek to
transform the meaning of the Constitution but also as a result of
pressure from below as interest groups coalesce to change the
path of the Court. In short, the substantive decisions of the
Court facilitated the rise of a conservative counter-mobilization
that seeks to transform the meaning of the Constitution by
appointing conservative partisans on the Supreme Court.
The appointments wars have long-term, negative
consequences for American democracy. Public support for the
Court may be undergoing erosion.15 7 Courts can play a role in
ameliorating political conflict only if they are perceived to be
independent of ideological and social forces. In his classic,
Whigs and Hunters, E.P. Thompson notes: "If the law is
evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing,
legitimize nothing . . . . The essential precondition for the
effectiveness of law ... is that it shall display an independence
from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just."158
Democracies require the alternation in power by opposing
factions. Constitutions play an important role in facilitating
regular turnover in power because electoral losers know that
there are limits to what electoral winners can do. If one faction
can entrench its partisans in the judicial system, however,
politics becomes polarized as the Constitution no longer
157. A recent survey found that "[miore than half of Americans are angry and
disappointed with the nation's judiciary" and that a "majority of the survey
respondents agreed with statements that judicial activism' has reached the crisis
stage, and that judges who ignore voters' values should be impeached." Martha
Neil, Half of U.S. Sees Judicial Activism Crisis, ABA Journal eReport (Sept. 30,
2005), http://www.abanet.org/journal/redesign/s30survey.html. Another survey
found that the Supreme Court's "public image has eroded significantly." Press
Release, The Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Supreme Court's Image
Declines as Nomination Battle Looms (June 15, 2005), http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=247. The Court has lost support among
Democrats who are unhappy over Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and among
Republicans "who want the court to take a tougher stand against abortion rights."
Id.; see generally Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial
Accountability, and Interbranch Relations (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Public Law
Working Paper No. 06-29), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=922091.
158. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 263
(1975).
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moderates but exacerbates conflict.159 American exceptionalism,
when it comes to the formal rules governing appointments, has
fueled distrust.
Although a vigorous debate is currently underway among
scholars over reforming judicial appointments, 160 the debate is
unlikely to bear fruit given the roadblocks to reform.16 Other
polities have powerful constitutional courts yet have managed to
avoid the appointments battles that plague the United States.
The nations of continental Europe, for example, largely require
a supermajority for appointment to national high courts. 6 2
Canada allows for temporary legislative overrides of Supreme
Court decisions. 163  The comparative experience shows the
importance of democratizing judicial review by creating
institutional mechanisms that make it impossible or unlikely
that factions will seek to transform the constitution by
influencing appointments. American constitutional theory, on
the other hand, has turned not to institutional mechanisms in
seeking to curb the Court, but to popular constitutionalism.
III. EX ANTE POPULAR CONTROLS OVER THE
CONSTITUTION
For all the disagreement about what we mean by 'republic,' no one has
ever doubted that self-government is its essence and a constitution the
purest distillate. What kind of republic removes its constitution from
the process of self-governing? Certainly not the one our Founders gave
us. Is it one we prefer? The choice, after all, is ours. The Supreme
Court has made its grab for power. The question is: will we let them
159. Political conflict in Latin America, for example, has been exacerbated by
the ease with which constitutions were manipulated by social forces. Schor,
Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, supra note 36, at 3-
7; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
160. The scholarship on reforming judicial appointments overwhelmingly
focuses on the problem of lifetime tenure rather than the advisability of
supermajoritarian appointment mechanisms. See, e.g., REFORMING THE COURT:
TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D.
Carrington eds., 2006). The problem, however, is not how to make a Supreme Court
more responsive to democratic pressures, which ending lifetime tenure would
certainly do, but rather how to fashion a court that is both responsive to the will of
the vast majority of Americans and sufficiently independent to retain legitimacy.
Supermajority appointment provisions attack this problem more directly than do
term limits for Supreme Court Justices.
161. See Law & Levinson, Why Nuclear Disarmament May Be Easier To Achieve
Than an End to Partisan Conflict over Judicial Appointments, supra note 49.
162. See infra Part III.
163. See infra Part IV.
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get away with it?164
Power grabs understandably elicit scholarly attention. The
revolutionary transformations wrought by the Warren Court
provided considerable and unprecedented grist for the
constitutional theory mill. Scholars sought to reconcile the
jurisprudence of the Warren Court with the belief that the
Supreme Court must be a legal rather than a political
institution if it was to retain legitimacy. Both Bickel's The Least
Dangerous Branch165 and Ely's Democracy and Distrust,166 for
example, sought to spin out normative theories that justified the
work of the Warren Court as a legal institution. Constitutional
theory posited that courts had the capacity to act in a principled
fashion that other political actors lacked. 167  Constitutional
theory did not take constitutional politics into account in
seeking to understand or legitimate the work of the Warren
Court.
Constitutional theory faced a different set of challenges
with the Rehnquist Court. Legal academics largely did not
approve of the Rehnquist Court,168 which was obviously more
conservative and, somewhat less obviously, more activist than
the Warren Court.1 69  More importantly, a transformation
occurred in the criticism levied at the Supreme Court. The
bedrock assumption that the correct normative theory could
constrain the Court's discretion had been shattered. 70
164. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term, Foreword: We the Court,
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 169 (2001).
165. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41.
166. ELY, supra note 61.
167. Keith E. Whittington, Herbert Wechsler's Complaint and the Revival of
Grand Constitutional Theory, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 509, 512-17 (2000).
168. The title of Cass Sunstein's recent book, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME
RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005), illustrates the polemical tone
of some of this criticism.
169. The Warren Court tangled more often with state actors than with federal
actors. POWE, supra note 67. The Rehnquist Court, on the other hand, was more
active than the Warren Court in invalidating federal statutes as it sought to trim
the sails of Congress and resurrect the power of states. KECK, supra note 7.
170. Judge Richard Posner's foreword to the Supreme Court's 2004 term arguing
that the Court is a political institution marks an important shift in the thinking of
lawyers and legal academics. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004
Term, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005). Such an article, by
perhaps the most famous federal judge currently sitting on the bench, in one of the
leading American law reviews, would have been unthinkable four decades ago when
the Warren Court was in its heyday. Judge Posner's claim is a matter of dispute
amount lawyers and legal academics, though it is a matter of bedrock faith for
political scientists.
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Conservative mistrust of liberal judicial activism that grew in
response to the Warren Court was now joined by liberal
mistrust of conservative judicial activism in response to the
Rehnquist Court. 171 As a result, normative theories that place
the Supreme Court at the center of the constitutional pantheon
must now contend with more radical and populist critiques that
aim at dethroning the Court as the supreme interpreter of the
Constitution. These theories rest on the assumption that if law
does not limit judicial discretion, then perhaps politics can.
Constitutional theory that once overwhelmingly stressed how
judges ought to interpret the law has important new offshoots
that look to the role that "we the people" might play in
constraining judicial discretion.172  Constitutional theory, in
short, no longer ignores the role of constitutional politics.
Larry D. Kramer is a forceful exponent of the need to curtail
the power of the Supreme Court. In The People Themselves:
Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, Kramer argues
that the founding generation had a very different understanding
of the Constitution than the one we hold today.1 73 The original
understanding was that the people made the Constitution and,
contrary to modern practice, also maintained and interpreted
it.174 Fundamental law was popular law because it rested on
consent and immemorial custom. 75 It could be changed only by
171. Though liberals criticized a number of Rehnquist Court decisions, Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), cemented liberal mistrust of the Rehnquist Court. See,
e.g., Balkin & Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, supra note
89, at 1049-50 (arguing that the Bush v. Gore decision amounted to a "constitutional
coup" in which "[flive members of the United States Supreme Court, confident of
their power, and brazen in their authority, engaged in flagrant judicial misconduct
that undermined the foundations of constitutional government").
172. This nascent shift in constitutional theory is mirrored by an analogous
transformation in views by political scientists about the Supreme Court. The once
prevailing orthodoxy argues that ideology determines how judges vote. JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
(1993). The attitudinal model rests on an assumption, which once united
constitutional theory, that one can explain the Supreme Court without taking its
environment into account. Id. More recent political science accounts of the Supreme
Court, much like the newer strands of constitutional theory, seek to contextualize
the Court by looking at the role of other actors and at history. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (arguing that the justices act
strategically by taking the preferences of other actors into account when rendering
decisions); Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the 'New Institutionalism,' and
the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (1988) (arguing that the values
that shape judicial preferences are historically constructed).
173. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 5 (2004).
174. Id. at 5-7.
175. Id.
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revolution or by the slow accretion of social change. 176 The
notion of giving the responsibility of interpreting and
implementing the Constitution to judges was "simply
unthinkable."17 7 Modern legal commentators, on the other
hand, argue that the constitutional framers sought to "create a
self-correcting system of checks and balances whose
fundamental operations could all take place from within the
government itself, with minimal involvement or interference
from the people."17 The modern view divorces politics from law
by entrusting the maintenance of the Constitution to the
Supreme Court rather than to the people. 79 Kramer believes
that the modern view has debilitated the citizenry and
exacerbated political conflict. 80 He concludes that the problems
currently afflicting American democracy would be alleviated if
the people were brought back into the mainstream of
constitutional maintenance and interpretation, thereby
recovering the lost Arcadian world of the founders.' 8 '
An important and negative consequence of the displacement
of the people by the Court is the increased politicization of the
nomination process. Appointments increasingly matter, as the
Court has become the last and the supreme word on the
meaning of the Constitution. Other polities, Kramer argues,
solved the problem of democratic debilitation by adopting a
different form of judicial review: 182
The nations of modern Europe have found more sensible ways to
handle this problem of control .... Appointment to the bench ...
typically requires a supermajority. . . guaranteeing that constitutional
courts have a mainstream ideology, while judges serve terms that are
limited and staggered to ensure a regular turnover. In addition, the
constitutions themselves are more easily amended than ours. The
combined effect of these innovations is to relieve the pressure a
doctrine of supremacy creates by reducing the likelihood of serious
breaches between the constitutional court and the other branches of
government, and by making political correctives easier to implement
when breaches occur. 18
3
Kramer is correct that the European model of judicial
review makes important improvements on the American model,
176. Id.
177. Id. at 7.
178. Id. at 5.
179. Id. at 248.
180. Id. at 248-53.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted).
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but his analysis of what is wrong with American
constitutionalism is flawed. The Supreme Court's assertion of
supremacy did not debilitate the people, but rather mobilized
them to seek to place their partisans on the Court. Social
conservatives have strong views on what the Constitution
means and do not supinely accept constitutional decisions they
believe are wrong. The problem is that a mobilized citizenry can
erode judicial independence. Courts can ameliorate political
conflict only if they are perceived as neutral arbiters. A
judiciary that is seen as accountable to a political faction, on the
other hand, lacks legitimacy.18 4 American exceptionalism in
judicial appointments undermines constitutionalism by
shrinking the distance between the people and the institutions
of governance.18 5
European constitutionalism works because appointment
rules structure constitutional politics differently, not because
European nations have virtuous citizens that behave like the
ideal of the founding generation. Factions cannot seek to
change constitutions by changing the personnel of national high
courts because a supermajority is typically required to appoint
constitutional judges. European constitutionalism has different
ex ante popular controls of the constitution than does the United
States because European constitutionalism rests on very
different assumptions. The appointment rules for the U.S.
Supreme Court were crafted in the late eighteenth century
when the power that the Court would one day wield was
unimaginable. When the nations of continental Europe created
constitutional courts in the wake of World War II, on the other
hand, there was no doubt, as richly evidenced by the history of
the U.S. Supreme Court, that a court with the authority to
interpret a constitution was a powerful political actor.
THE EUROPEAN MODEL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The nations of continental Europe could not simply graft
American-style judicial review in constructing constitutional
judicial review after World War 11186 for two reasons. First, the
184. Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55 (Irwin P. Stotzky
ed., 1993).
185. See generally FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD (2003).
186. Although there were European outliers, such as Austria, that adopted
judicial review prior to World War II, constitutional judicial review did not become
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intellectual environment of late twentieth-century Europe was
profoundly different than that of late eighteenth-century
America. The framers of the American Constitution assumed
that there was a clear delineation between law and politics, and
that the new Supreme Court would, therefore, be a court of
law.187 After more than a century of American experience with
judicial review, it was clear to Europeans that the American
Supreme Court was not simply a legal institution but a political
one as well.'88 Second, the nations of continental Europe had a
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty that was difficult to
reconcile with judicial review. 89 Legislatures, not courts, were
supreme in interpreting the constitution. As a consequence, the
strong form of American judicial review, with its
correspondingly weak provisions for political accountability, was
unacceptable.190 These two factors led Europeans to devise a
the norm until after the war. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1989). European-style judicial review, moreover, has
become a very influential model throughout the world. GINSBURG, supra note 70, at
7-9.
187. Alexander Hamilton defended judicial review on these grounds. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 99; see generally NELSON, supra note 100.
188. See ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN EUROPE 32-34 (2000). The realistic "reception" of judicial review in
twentieth century Europe differs markedly from nineteenth century, continental
attitudes towards judicial interpretation. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE
AND LATIN AMERICA 39-47 (1985). The nineteenth-century view was that only
legislators made law and that judges were to simply interpret it. Id. The current
conservative critique of constitutional interpretation in the United States looks
oddly like what was once in vogue in nineteenth-century France when it came to
interpreting the civil code. See SCALIA, supra note 45, at 37-47 (arguing that in
interpreting the law, judges should behave like virtuous civil law judges who do not
make law but only interpret it). The classic view of the role of the civil law judge
described by Merryman, however, has never adequately described the behavior of
civilian judges, who, like their common law counterparts, make law while
interpreting it. SHAPIRO, supra note 71, at 126-56; Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser,
Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE
L.J. 1325 (1995).
189. Mauro Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and
Legitimacy of "Constitutional Justice," 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (1985); Louis
Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38, 45 (Louis Henkin &
Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication and
Democracy, Comparative Perspectives: USA, France, Italy, 11 RATIO JURIS 38, 45
(1998). Professor Michael Louis Corrado builds his recent casebook on comparative
judicial review around differing notions of parliamentary sovereignty. See MICHAEL
LOuIS CORRADO, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW (2005).
190. Mark Tushnet coined the expression "strong-form review" to describe
American and German judicial review. Mark Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison Around
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different form of judicial review that acknowledges its political
nature by providing stronger democratic checks.
Although constitutional judicial review would not be
adopted in Europe until after World War II, an important
debate occurred in the first half of the twentieth century. A
number of French public law scholars argued that American-
style judicial review should be adopted. 191 This intellectual
movement criticized the traditional understanding of the
separation of powers and its prohibition against constitutional
review. 192 These scholars believed that adopting judicial review
was the key to ensuring the supremacy of the constitution over
ordinary legislation. The attempt to graft judicial review was
challenged, however, by scholars who criticized the American
Supreme Court for blocking social legislation by a "restrictive
judicial reading of the due process clause."1 93 Lochner was a
powerful anti-model 94 for forces opposed to the adoption of
American-style judicial review. The scholars who challenged
the adoption of judicial review succeeded in destroying
"whatever effective political support [that had] existed within
parliament."195
While the debate over adopting American-style judicial
review was being waged vigorously in France during the first
half of the twentieth century, the intellectual groundwork for a
different form of judicial review was being crafted in Austria by
Hans Kelsen. 196 Kelsen understood that judicial review in
Europe would have to take a different form than in the United
the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 251, 260 (2004). Although there is no doubt that
Germany has a powerful constitutional court, this Article reserves the term "strong-
form review" for the United States, and contrasts American exceptionalism with the
weaker forms of review that prevail in Europe and Canada. Strong forms ofjudicial
review are characterized by weak rules of political accountability. Weaker forms of
judicial review are characterized by stronger rules of political accountability.
191. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23-27 (1992); ALEC STONE,
THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 31-45 (1992); Michael H. Davis, A Government of
Judges: an Historical Re-View, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 559 (1987).
192. BELL, supra note 191, at 25.
193. STONE, supra note 191, at 39.
194. Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the
"Rise of World Constitutionalism," 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597.
195. STONE, supra note 191, at 39-40; see also BELL, supra note 191, at 26-27
("Time and again the opponents of constitutional review would point to the
experience of the United States in the [the early twentieth century] as an
illustration of what could happen in France.").
196. Hans Kelsen, La Garantie Juridictionnelle de la Constitution, REVUE DU
DROIT PUBLIC 197 (1928).
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States so that it could please two groups that were at
loggerheads: "politicians suspicious of the judiciary and judicial
power, and a pan-European movement of prominent legal
scholars who favored installing American judicial review on the
Continent."197 Kelsen proposed that judicial review be exercised
by a specialized body, a constitutional court, with carefully
circumscribed powers. 198 Kelsen "thought that a constitutional
court had to be a special kind of court because constitutional law
was a special kind of law."199 He argued that a court with the
power to invalidate legislation that contravened the constitution
exercised political as well as lawmaking authority.200 To limit
this potentially dangerous delegation of power, Kelsen
distinguished between negative and positive lawmaking. 201 The
latter was the province of the legislator, the former of judges.20 2
Kelsen believed the distinction between negative and positive
lawmaking could be maintained if constitutions did not contain
human rights due to their open-ended nature.20 3  Kelsen
proposed that the members of these specialized constitutional
courts be selected by politicians.20 4  He also argued that
constitutional courts should review legislation before it was
promulgated, "thus preserving the sovereign character of
statute [s] within the legal system."20 5
Kelsen's ideas proved very influential in the construction of
judicial review in Europe after World War II. The desire to deal
with the legacies of human rights violations led to the creation
of specialized constitutional courts.206 The European model of
judicial review differs from American-style judicial review along
three dimensions. 20 7 First, the European model provides one
197. Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review and Why
It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2766 (2003).
198. Id.
199. Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison Around the World, supra note 190, at 258.
200. Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review, supra note 197, at
2767.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2768.
205. Id.
206. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons
from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1674-75 (2004).
207. Kelsen's ideas were obviously not adopted in toto. Id. By and large, the
nations of Europe after World War II rejected his idea that constitutions should not
contain a bill of rights. Id. A bill of rights and a specialized body charged with
protecting those rights are, after all, very appealing tools with which to combat the
legacy of authoritarianism and human rights violations. Id.
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court, a constitutional court, with a monopoly over
constitutional adjudication.208 Judicial review is centralized in
Europe, whereas it is diffuse in the United States. 2 9 Given
Europe's long tradition of parliamentary supremacy, specialized
courts that were empowered to deal with constitutional issues
were needed as a counterweight. 210 The ordinary courts in
Europe lacked the independence and prestige to be able to
effectively check parliament.21' Second, judicial review in
Europe is abstract, whereas it is concrete in the United
States.21 2 Review is abstract in Europe because statutes may be
challenged before they are promulgated. Review is concrete in
the United States because courts may hear only cases or
controversies. 213 Professor Alec Stone Sweet writes: "European
constitutional courts were designed as relatively pure oracles of
the constitutional law."21 4 Third, the appointment procedures
differ and appointments have term limits. 215 The United States
has a majoritarian appointment process, whereas the nations of
Europe typically have a supermajoritarian process. 216  An
208. Although concentrated review is the norm in continental Europe, there are
exceptions. The nations of Scandinavia, for example, adopted diffuse judicial review,
but that power is seldom exercised. Jaakko Husa, Guarding the Constitutionality of
Laws in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Perspective, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 345,
373-81 (2000).
209. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 186, at 132-49; SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES,
supra note 188, at 31-37.
210. Cf DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 3 (2d ed. 1997) ("The deeply ingrained Continental
belief that judicial review is a political act, following the assumption that
'constitutional law ... is genuine political law, in contrast, for example, to civil and
criminal law,' prompted Germans to vest the power to declare laws unconstitutional
in a special tribunal... ." (citation omitted)).
211. Although some parliamentary systems, such as Canada, have diffuse
review, there is an affinity between parliamentary government and constitutional
courts. See Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review, supra note 197,
at 2769 ("The European model of review proved popular because-unlike American
judicial review-it could be easily attached to the parliamentary-based architecture
of the state."); Favoreu, supra note 189, at 56.
212. SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES, supra note 188, at 41-46.
213. Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison Around the World, supra note 190, at 254-
55.
214. Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review, supra note 197, at
2771.
215. See Lee Epstein et al., Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 12 (2001) (noting that some nations with constitutional courts
rejected the American model in selecting and retaining judges "presumably to
maximize accountability"); Ferejohn & Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication, supra
note 206, at 1681.
216. Ferejohn & Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 206, at 1681.
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important consequence of requiring a supermajority for
appointment is that judges are more broadly representative of a
polity's culture and ideals. 217
Scholars disagree whether these differences matter. One
view focuses on the substantive divergences between European
and American constitutionalism. 218 In a number of substantive
areas such as freedom of speech,219 the protection of human
dignity,220 the protective function of the state, 221 and the role of
international factors in domestic constitutionalism,222 European
France is an important exception. Id. The French Constitutional Council consists of
nine members appointed by the President of the Republic, the President of the
Senate, or the President of the National Assembly, each of whom appoint one
member every three years for a nonrenewable term of nine years. BELL, supra note
191, at 34.
217. See Donald P. Kommers, American Courts and Democracy: A Comparative
Perspective, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 200, 214 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire
eds., 2005) (noting that Germany's judicial appointment process "has resulted in the
election ofjudges broadly representative of German political life and culture").
218. George Nolte, Introduction-European and U.S. Constitutionalism:
Comparing Essential Elements, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 3-20
(G. Nolte ed., 2005).
219. See Frederick Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and
the United States: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in
EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 49, 49-69 (G. Nolte ed., 2005) (observing
that the United States protects hate speech whereas European constitutionalism
does not).
220. The term human dignity is of fairly recent constitutional vintage. Giovanni
Bognetti, The Concept of Human Dignity in European and U.S. Constitutionalism,
in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 85, 89 (G. Nolte ed., 2005). The term is
found in a number of post-war European constitutions, but not in the American
constitution. Id. at 89, 101 ("IThe US Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, seems to offer less protection to values and rights associated with the idea of
human dignity than the average European Constitution.").
221. See Frank I. Michelman, The Protective Function of the State in the United
States and Europe: The Constitutional Question, in EUROPEAN AND U.S.
CONSTITUTIONALISM 156, 156-80 (G. Nolte ed., 2005). The United States has
resisted implying a positive duty on the part of the state. DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (stating that the due
process clause is not a "guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security").
The differing European attitude can be seen most markedly in the famous German
abortion decision reasoning that the right to life required that the state protect the
fetus under criminal law. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 337-48 (1997) (providing a
translation of the case Abortion 1).
222. European nations are open to the influence of constitutional decisions in
other polities, whereas the United States is undergoing a heated debate led by
Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia on this topic. See The Relevance of Foreign Legal
Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin
Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005). This
disagreement produced sharply divided opinions in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). See generally Jed Rubenfeld,
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constitutionalism clearly differs from American
constitutionalism. A contrary view argues that "despite obvious
organic differences between the American and European
systems of review, there is an increasing convergence in how
review actually operates."223  Professor Sweet, for example,
concludes that the U.S. Supreme Court is becoming specialized
in constitutional law like its constitutional court counterparts in
Europe, whereas European abstract review is becoming more
concrete.2
24
The difficulty in comparing European and American
constitutionalism is that the obvious differences, such as
specialized courts exercising abstract review, matter less than
the differing appointments mechanisms. Professor Michel
Rosenfeld notes that the abstract nature of judicial review
makes judicial review look more openly political than does the
concrete review exercised in the United States, yet "American
constitutional adjudication has been attacked much more
vehemently for being unduly political than its European
counterpart."225  Europe transformed judicial review in the
process of adopting it by democratizing an inherently non-
democratic institution. Constitutional review has proven less
problematic in Europe than in the United States in large part
because supermajority provisions ensure that there is less
ideological polarization on European constitutional courts than
on the United States Supreme Court. European courts can and
do issue decisions that lead to political backlash. What cannot
readily occur, however, is the rise of a sustained social
movement whose primary objective is to transform the
constitution by changing the membership of a nation's high
court. Such a goal would be difficult given supermajority
appointment provisions, and would also make little sense given
that European constitutions are easier to amend than the
American constitution. 226 Strengthening ex ante controls over
The Two World Orders, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 233 (G. Nolte
ed., 2005).
223. Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review, supra note 197, at
2746.
224. Id. at 2477.
225. Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United
States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 197,
198 (G. Nolte ed., 2005); cf Peter E. Quint, "The Most Extraordinarily Powerful
Court of Law the World Has Ever Known?"-Judicial Review in the United States
and Germany, 65 MD. L. REV. 152 (2006).
226. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 218-20 (1999).
2007]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
judicial review, however, is not the only mechanism by which
the people can be empowered to exercise control over their
Constitution. Canada provides an example of how post facto
controls may diminish the power of factions by democratizing
judicial review.
IV. POST FACTO POPULAR CONTROLS OVER THE
CONSTITUTION
Some think that the Supreme Court's elaboration of constitutional law
has given us a rich vocabulary of practical political philosophy. It has
not. It may have given the Supreme Court and some constitutional
lawyers such a vocabulary.... The Declaration of Independence and
the Preamble to the Constitution give all of us that opportunity....
Perhaps it is time for us to reclaim it from the courts. 227
A constitution is, as Karl Llewellyn once remarked, a
"peculiar institution" because it involves a way of "living and
doing" of "well-nigh the whole population."228 The existence of
shared attitudes "toward the verbal symbol 'Constitution' and
toward any person supposed to be attacking 'It' is crucial if
constitutions are to limit power.229 The court of public opinion,
not a court of law, is the primary mechanism for enforcing
constitutions. 230  Courts cannot limit power if citizens are
unwilling to mobilize when constitutional guarantees are
violated.231 The question then is the role that courts play in
constructing and maintaining the attitudes needed to sustain
constitutional democracy.
Popular constitutionalism is an intellectual project that
posits a deep tension between the attitudes and beliefs needed
to sustain constitutional democracy and judicial review.232
227. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note
81, at 194.
228. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
17-18 (1934).
229. Id. at 18.
230. President Bush's extraordinary assertion of power in the wake of the events
of September 11, 2001, will ultimately be resolved by the people as they decide what
sort of government they desire. See generally Keith Whittington, Yet Another
Constitutional Crisis, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093, 2109 (2001).
231. The historical experience of Latin America, for example, demonstrates that
constitutions that lack popular support facilitate dictatorship rather than
democracy. Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America,
supra note 36, at 3-7.
232. See Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking
Forewards: Judicial Review v. Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L.
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Kramer, for example, believes that the attitudes once shared by
the virtuous citizens of the Republic have been eroded by
judicial supremacy.233 Tushnet shares with Kramer the view
that judicial review undermines the attitudes needed to sustain
democracy, but Tushnet's criticism runs deeper than
Kramer's. 234 In Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts,
Tushnet aims at doing away with judicial review, not just
judicial supremacy, in construing the Constitution. 235 Judicial
review, he argues, "amounts to noise around zero" because it
"offers essentially random changes, sometimes good and
sometimes bad, to what the political system produces."236
Tushnet's attack on judicial review is based on the
distinction he makes between the thin and the thick
constitution. 237 The thin constitution consists of the principles
embedded in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble
to the Constitution that constitute the nation.238 The thick
constitution, on the other hand, consists of the detailed
provisions that organize the government. 239 The provisions of
the thick constitution are important, but they neither "generate"
passion nor adherence to the Constitution. 240 The people can be
"committed to the thin Constitution in ways they could never be
committed to the thick Constitution."241 The problem with
judicial review is that the public learns to leave important
issues to the courts, thereby eroding public discussion and
adherence to the thin constitution.242 Tushnet concludes his
attack on judicial review by suggesting that perhaps we need an
amendment precluding courts from construing the
constitution. 243 Doing away with judicial review, according to
REV. 415, 421 (2000).
233. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 173, at 249-53.
234. See TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra
note 81.
235. Id. at 153.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 9.
238. Id. at 11.
239. Id. at 9.
240. Id. at 10.
241. Id. at 12.
242. Id. at 9-13, 154-76.
243. Id. at 175. Professor Tushnet's proposed "End Judicial Review
Amendment" provides: "Except as authorized by Congress, no court of the United
States or any individual state shall have the power to review the constitutionality of
statues enacted by Congress or by state legislatures." Id. Laurence H. Tribe,
Jeremy Waldron, and Mark Tushnet conducted a spirited debate on the proposed
amendment in On Judicial Review, DISSENT MAGAZINE, Summer 2005, available at
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Tushnet, will make space for the people to discuss the
"Constitution's meaning ... in the ordinary venues for political
discussion."
244
In seeking to take the constitution away from the courts,
Tushnet fails to appreciate why democracies choose to provide
judicial protection of rights. Rights that are embedded in
politics, but not the law, as Tushnet urges, can be effectuated
only through electoral channels. The problem with relying
solely on elections to effectuate rights is that there are a number
of roadblocks to collective action. Polities throughout the world
adopted judicially enforceable constitutional guarantees because
they allow individuals to effectuate their rights at a lower cost
than having to seek political vindication of such rights.
Legalizing rights, moreover, does not debilitate democracy
as Tushnet argues. The law is a democratic form of
policymaking because it relies on citizens filing suits. 245 Courts
cannot effectuate rights without a stream of litigation. The real
problem in constitutional engineering, therefore, is to find a
balance between politics and law so that courts do not gain
mastery over the constitution at the expense of the people. A
more effective means for taking the constitution away from the
courts--one that respects the political economy of rights-is
provided by Canada's post facto popular control of
constitutionalism.
THE CANADIAN MODEL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Popular constitutionalism wrestles with the question of how
the dictates of a constitution can best be made effective.
Historically, there were two answers to that question: politics or
law.246 The former is the Westminster model of parliamentary
supremacy; the latter is the American system of judicial review.
The Westminster model, which was once the dominant model
among the world's more stable democracies, no longer exists in
its pure form. 24 7  The nations of continental Europe adopted
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=219.
244. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note
81, at 14.
245. See EPP, supra note 75, at 44-70; Schor, The Rule of Law, supra note 141;
Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the
Political System, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 692 (1983).
246. Cf Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633,
688-93 (2000).
247. Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-
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judicial review in the wake of World War II. These nations
rejected the American strong form of judicial review and
democratized the practice by adopting supermajoritian
appointment procedures. 248  The nations of the British
commonwealth were the last stable democracies to adopt
judicial review, but they too rejected the pure American model
since they give courts the first, but not the last word, in
exercising judicial review.249  Democracy may not have
conquered the world, but judicial review, in some form or other,
has conquered democracy. Popular constitutionalism is
swimming against a worldwide historical current.
The Canadian model of judicial review demonstrates that
judicial review need not be joined at the hip with judicial
supremacy, even if American courts have blurred the distinction
between the two.250 Canada has rejected the U.S. Supreme
Court's conclusion that courts must have the last word in
construing the Constitution lest constitutional supremacy be
undermined. Section 33 of the Canadian Constitution provides:
"Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in
an Act of Parliament or of the legislature . . . that the Act or a
provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in
section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter." 251
Section 33, or the "notwithstanding clause," seeks to bridge
the divide between the British practice of politicizing the
enforcement of rights and the American practice of judicializing
the enforcement of rights. Section 33 has been reviled and
praised by Canadian politicians 252 as well as scholars who
dispute how well it comports with Canadian democracy.25 3
Section 33 has also become an important topic in comparative
and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 815 (2003).
248. See supra Part III.
249. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism,
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 709 (2001). Australia is perhaps the last holdout, but it has
adopted a weak form ofjudicial review by means ofjudicial interpretation. JASON L.
PIERCE, INSIDE THE MASON REVOLUTION: THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TRANSFORMED 157-89 (2006).
250. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958).
251. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) § 33(1) (emphasis added).
252. Rainer Knopff & Andrew Banfield, "It's the Charter Stupid!" Electoral
Politics and the Supreme Court, (June 2, 2005) (on file with author).
253. Compare Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue
Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad
Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 75 (1997), with CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI,
JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER (2001).
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constitutional theory as scholars disagree whether it marks a
new form of judicial review.254
The origins of Section 33 can be found in Section 2 of the
Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 (CBOR).255  The CBOR,
however, was a statutory bill of rights and had little impact
because the courts viewed "their power through the traditional
lens of parliamentary sovereignty."256 Unhappiness with the
CBOR's lack of effectiveness provided the impetus for the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.25 7 Pierre Trudeau initiated
the process that would eventually culminate in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms when he was elected Prime
Minister in 1968.258 In the final negotiations that led to the
adoption of the Charter, there was considerable opposition on
the part of the provinces to a constitutionalized and entrenched
bill of rights.259 Professor Paul C. Weiler notes: "The source of
the provincial leaders' concern was the same as the source of the
Charter's popular attraction: observation of Canada's next-door
neighbor's two centuries of experience with constitutionalized
rights."260 Section 33 was adopted as the result of a last minute
compromise that made possible the adoption of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.261 The Canadian Charter of
254. Compare Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review, supra note 247, at 818-
20 (arguing that Section 33 power represents "weak-form" judicial review), with
Gardbaum, supra note 249, at 726-27 (arguing that the popular convention against
the use of the Section 33 power has resulted in little or no practical change in
Canadian judicial review mechanisms).
255. Gardbaum, supra note 249, at 719-20. Section 2 was designed to reconcile
parliamentary sovereignty with a statutory bill of rights. The problem was that a
statute enacted after the CBOR was promulgated might be construed to impliedly
abrogate the rights contained in the CBOR. To prevent this from occurring, Section
2 provided: "Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of
Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of
Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe... any of
the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared." Canadian Bill of Rights,
1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2 Ch. 44 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C. (Appendix 1985) § 2.
256. Gardbaum, supra note 249, at 720.
257. Howard Leeson, Section 33, the Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?,
CHOICES: INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC POLICY, June 2000, at 1, 7, available
at http://www.irpp.org/choices/archive/vol6no4.pdf.
258. Id. at 7-8.
259. Id. at 9-12; see also MANFREDI, supra note 253, at XIII-XVI, 181-84.
260. Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian
Version, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 52 (1984).
261. Leeson, supra note 257, at 13. (noting that the decision to insert section 33
into the Charter "had more to do with the raw politics of bargaining and chance
phone calls late at night than with reasoned debate about what might constitute a
rational compromise between democracy and constitutional law"). There is some
dispute as to the origins of the notwithstanding clause, however, because some
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Rights and Freedom sought to adopt the more attractive
features of American constitutionalism and reject its more
repellant ones by constitutionalizing rights while allowing a
legislative override.262
Although the notwithstanding clause was crucial to the
adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and has
important theoretical implications, it has not fared well in
Canada's constitutional politics. The few times it has been used
have proven controversial. Quebec used the notwithstanding
clause primarily to protect language rights.26 3 This led to a
strong negative reaction 264 as language rights for the French
minority is a contentious political and constitutional issue.265
The political "demonization" of Section 33 has spread to other
issues. 266 The two major political parties have wrangled over
whether to use the notwithstanding clause to deal with the
Canadian Supreme Court's recent decision on same-sex
marriage. 267 The politicization of same-sex marriage in Canada
represents the mirror of how that issue has been politicized in
the United States. In the United States, it has been
conservatives who have successfully used same sex marriage as
a wedge issue to mobilize voters. In Canada, it has been the
Liberal Party that has successfully portrayed the Conservative
Party's willingness to use the notwithstanding clause to deal
with the same sex jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme
Court as "hostility to the Charter itself and thus to fundamental
Canadian values."268 Any attempt by the federal or a provincial
government to use the notwithstanding language in proposed
"participants described the override not as part of a second-best solution but as
preferable to a fully entrenched bill of rights with no possibility for legislative
response." Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2
INT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 45 (2004).
262. Choudhry, supra note 261, at 43-48 (emphasizing the importance of
Lochner v. New York as an anti-model in the drafting of Section 33).
263. MANFREDI, supra note 253, at 186.
264. When Quebec used the override to insulate legislation mandating the use of
French in commercial signs in 1988, Canada's Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called
Section 33 "that major fatal flaw of 1981, which ... renders the entire constitution
suspect." Id. He stated that a constitution "that does not protect the inalienable
and imprescriptible individual rights of individual Canadians is not worth the paper
it is written on." Id.
265. For a good discussion of the role that the politics of language rights played
in the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, see Weiler, supra note 260,
at 56-60.
266. Knopff& Banfield, supra note 252, at 5-15.
267. Id.; See Reference re Same Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.R. 698.
268. Knopff& Banfield, supra note 252, at 8.
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legislation allows the supporters of the primacy of the judiciary
in construing the Charter to mobilize. As a consequence,
governments have been "exceedingly reluctant to use [Section]
33. 269
Section 33 has had not only a checkered political history,
but has also been a matter of dispute among scholars who
debate whether it contributes to Canada's democracy. Scholars
who believe that Section 33 contributes to a democratic
"dialogue" between legislatures and courts stress that it resolves
the countermajoritarian difficulty.270 Courts are afforded the
power of judicial review to ensure that all organs of government
are subject to constitutional dictates. The problem, of course, is
that constitutional restrictions on power are open-ended and
afford courts considerable discretion. 271 Professor Weiler notes
that the "fancy claims legal scholars make for judicial reflection
about issues of high moral principle" in construing the
constitution must be balanced against the reality that
legislatures are better equipped to make policy decisions. 272
Section 33 deals with this problem by providing both courts and
legislatures the authority to determine constitutional meaning.
Scholars who disagree that Section 33 contributes to a
democratic dialogue point, rather unsurprisingly, to its relative
lack of use. Professor Manfredi argues that judicial review is
necessary to make checks and balances work, yet courts are not
subject to any effective checks since Section 33 has seldom been
used. 273 Section 33, in short, may provide a formal solution to
the countermajoritarian difficulty while not resolving the
debilitation problem that may occur when courts gain
supremacy over constitutional construction. 274
Comparative scholars debate whether Section 33 represents
an important constitutional innovation. Professor Gardbaum
argues that Canada is part of a trend among Commonwealth
nations to find a middle way between parliamentary and
269. 2 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 36-39 (4th ed. 2004)
(on file with author).
270. Hogg & Bushell, supra note 253; Weiler, supra note 260.
271. Hogg & Bushell, supra note 253, at 77.
272. Weiler, supra note 260, at 73.
273. MANFREDI, supra note 253, at 181-88.
274. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Judicial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 470 (2003) ("[Jludicial enforcement of constitutional
rights" may corrode "'the habits and temperament' that are necessary for democracy
to thrive." (quoting F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND
THE COURT PARTY (2000))).
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judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation. 275  By
democratizing judicial review, the notwithstanding clause
prevents courts from unduly interfering with legislatures. It
was designed to prevent the possibility of the kind of impasse
between Congress and the Supreme Court that led to F.D.R.'s
court-packing plan.276 It also serves as a breakwater for social
mobilization. When factions are angered by judicial decisions,
they are more likely to pursue an override than to seek to
influence the appointments process.2 7 7 Professor Tushnet, on
the other hand, argues that as a practical matter Canadian
courts are supreme in construing the Charter as Section 33 is
seldom used. 278 The desuetude of Section 33 for Tushnet is proof
that the public has accepted judicial supremacy as legislatures
find it politically unpalatable to override judicial decisions they
disagree with.27 9 For Tushnet, there is no middle ground
between parliamentary and judicial supremacy.
This Article argues that the importance of Section 33 lies
along a different dimension: how it structures the relationship
between society and courts. Canada's Supreme Court is more
susceptible than the U.S. Supreme Court to the problem of
faction. There are three principal mechanisms that polities use
in appointing Justices: monocratic (Canada), majoritarian
(United States), and supermajoritarian (the European model).280
Canada follows the British model in providing the chief
executive virtually unfettered authority to appoint Justices. 28'
The British system worked well when paired with
parliamentary supremacy but is problematic when courts have
the final word on what the constitution means. Canada,
however, has not yet experienced the appointment wars that are
now part of the American constitutional political landscape.
The Charter is quite new and the Liberal Party has dominated
275. Gardbaum, supra note 249, at 760.
276. Choudry, supra note 261, at 47.
277. Id. at 48.
278. Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review, supra note 247, at 832-33.
279. Id. at 833.
280. Ferejohn & Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 206, at 1681.
281. F. L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A System in
Transition, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 56, 56-57 (Kate Malleson & Peter H.
Russell eds., 2006); Peter McCormick, Essay: Selecting the Supremes: The
Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 1,
14-17 (2005); Jacob S. Ziegel, Merit Selection and Democratization of Appointments
to the Supreme Court of Canada, CHOICES: INST. FOR RES. ON PUB. POL'Y, June 1999,
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the government for much of its existence, which has minimized
political struggle over appointments. 2 2 More importantly, as
the American experience suggests, citizen mobilization over
appointments is fashioned in a long-term, historical process.
With increased experience under the Charter, Canadians may
seek to exert greater control over judicial nominations as they
begin to "appreciate the important roles of personalities and
judicial philosophies in the interpretation and application of the
Charter norms. "283
The importance of Section 33 is illustrated by the debate
between the two leading candidates to- become Canada's Prime
Minister in January 2006. The Liberal candidate, Paul Martin,
sought to gain electoral ground on the Conservative front-
runner, Stephen Harper, by promising to repeal Ottawa's power
to override Canada's Charter of Rights."28 4 Harper opposed
same-sex marriage but pledged not to use the override to outlaw
same sex-marriage. 28 5 Martin's promise to end the federal
government's power to use the override was made to sharpen
the parties' difference on the issue of same-sex marriage. 28 6
There was considerable criticism of Martin's proposal, however,
which suggests that the retention of the notwithstanding clause
282. See Ziegel, supra note 281, at 9-10. But see Morton, supra note 281, at 60-
62.
283. Ziegel, supra note 281, at 14. The seeds of an American-style appointments
war may have been planted during Canada's 2006 parliamentary elections when
Stephen Harper, the Conservative candidate, defeated Paul Martin, the Liberal
candidate. Stephen Harper's lead in the polls took a hit when he suggested that
activist judges that had been appointed by Liberals were promoting their own social
agendas. Gloria Galloway, Harper Warns of Activist Judges, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan.
19, 2006, at Al. Martin accused Harper of planning to appoint judges who would
draw a social-conservative agenda from the "extreme right" in the United States.
Campbell Clark, Harper Eager To Politicize Top Court, Martin Warns, GLOBE &
MAIL, Jan. 20, 2006, at A4. As a consequence of this debate, Harper's lead in the
polls diminished somewhat. Steven Chase, Gloria Galloway & Campbell Clark,
Harper's Lead Takes a Hit, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 20, 2006, at Al.
Canada's nomination process may be undergoing an important change as a
public hearing was held for the first time on February 27, 2006. Gloria Galloway &
Richard Blackwell, Top-Court Nominee Faces Fire Monday, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 21,
2006, at Al. The nominee, Justice Marshall Rothstein, stated, unsurprisingly, that
he was no activist while sidestepping "questions about the validity of the
notwithstanding clause in the Constitution and how the court should arbitrate
moral issues." Campbell Clark, Nominee Says He's No Activist, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb.
28, 2006, at Al.
284. Brian Laghi et al, Martin Hits Hard at Harper, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 10,
2006, at Al.
285. Id.
286. Daniel LeBlanc, Martin's Charter Promise Easier Said Than Done, GLOBE
& MAIL, Jan. 11, 2006, at A10.
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has political support.287 The reason that there is more support
for retaining the notwithstanding clause than there is for its use
lies in the function it plays. Professor Choudry notes: "To its
defenders, the override serves as an outlet, channeling
potentially dangerous and destructive responses to judicial
decisions into legislative forums where brute power is tempered
by the demands of public justification and the procedures of
parliamentary democracy."288 In particular, if the citizens are
unhappy with a particular constitutional provision, they are
more likely to seek a legislative override than to pack the courts
with their supporters. 28 9 Section 33 allows courts to issue
opinions that roil the political waters while making it less likely
that the factions will seek to dominate the appointments
process. The notwithstanding clause, in short, functions like the
"beware of dog" sign that some homeowners put up even though
they do not own a dog.
V. CONCLUSIONS: DEMOCRATIZING JUDICIAL REVIEW
[Tihe candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government
upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably
fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in
ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people will
have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically
resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges. It is
a duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly
brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn
their decisions to political purposes.
290
Lincoln certainly had it right when he argued that the
people cease to be their own rulers if courts gain constitutional
supremacy. The world's democracies and constitutional theory
have been on oddly convergent paths as both seek to balance the
power of courts and citizens over constitutional meaning by
democratizing judicial review. The twentieth century witnessed
a worldwide expansion of judicial review291  as nations
287. Joan Bryden, Liberal MPs, Experts Pan Martin's Promise to Repeal
Notwithstanding Clause, AP ALERT-LEGAL, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Jan. 10, 2006.
288. Choudry, supra note 283, at 48.
289. See Daniel LeBlanc, Martin's Charter Promise Easier Said Than Done,
GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 11, 2006, at A10.
290. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861),
available at http'//www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/lincolnl.htm.
291. THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn
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democratized 292 but polities rejected American-style strong-form
review with its correspondingly weak form of political
accountability. No polity could readily ignore the power
exercised by the American Supreme Court in designing judicial
review in the twentieth century. Although there are a number
of mechanisms that may be used to cabin courts, modem
democracies have overwhelmingly relied on ex ante and post
facto mechanisms of popular control over the meaning of the
constitution.
Constitutional theory rather oddly ignored the role that
citizens play in shaping constitutional meaning until the advent
of popular constitutionalism. American debates over the
propriety of judicial review were long trapped in an odd
nineteenth-century time warp that courts exercise only
judgment 293  whereas legislatures exercise will. The
countermajoritarian difficulty at bottom posits that courts
should police themselves by adopting the correct interpretive
theory lest they trample on democracy. The problem with
Bickel and his interlocutors is that they ignore the role that the
people play in maintaining the Constitution as a living
institution. The counter-constitutional difficulty, on the other
hand, acknowledges that the people, not the courts, are the
ultimate arbiter of what the Constitution means.
Courts can, and do, however, further the interests of
factions rather than those of "we the people."294 This Article
argues that the tension between law and politics, which
constitutional theory sought to resolve by grappling with the
countermajoritarian difficulty, looks very different when viewed
from the vantage point of constitutional politics. The problem is
not that courts might impermissibly interfere with legislatures,
but that judicial review might facilitate a form of constitutional
politics that threatens to undermine the constitution. Given the
rigors of Article V, the easiest way to amend the Constitution is
to place one's partisans on the Supreme Court. A number of
decisions by the Court have played an important role in
mobilizing religious conservatives who now seek to amend the
Constitution by transforming the membership of the Court. The
appointments battles that led to the nominations of Justices
Vallinder eds., 1995).
292. HUNTINGTON, supra note 52.
293. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977).
294. RAN HIRScHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
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Roberts and Alito, and to the withdrawal of Harriet Miers,
illustrate the strategy and the power of this conservative
movement. By playing an important role in nomination battles,
factions shape the meaning of the Constitution. The
polarization in the appointments process, in short, is the
Achilles heel of the Constitution.
Popular constitutionalism departs from much existing
constitutional theory by. bringing "we the people" back into our
understanding of how constitutional meaning is shaped.
Professor Kramer fears that the arrogation of judicial
supremacy by the Supreme Court will undermine the republican
virtues needed to sustain democracy.295 Professor Tushnet is
concerned that judicial review "amounts to noise around zero."296
The United States would be better off without it, he argues, so
that Americans could discuss the principles that constitute their
collective national identity in the venues of ordinary politics. 297
Kramer and Tushnet are right to underscore the danger of
citizens losing attachment to the Constitution.
The problem with popular constitutionalism, however, is
that the people have never supinely accepted the power of a
political body, even one as august as the Supreme Court of the
United States, to define the identity of a nation. American
history is replete with social movements that fought the Court
over the meaning of the Constitution.298 Social movements can
seek constitutional change either by changing public opinion or
by changing the membership of the Supreme Court.299 The
former plays a key role in maintaining the constitution as a
living institution,300 whereas the latter erodes democracy.
Constitutional democracy works when it channels social forces
seeking change into a two level game. A bare majority is needed
295. See supra notes 173 to 183 and accompanying text.
296. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note
81, at 153.
297. Id. at 154-76.
298. See infra Part II. Indeed the comparative evidence is quite strong that one
of the consequences of providing courts with the power of judicial review is that
social movements will orient their activity towards winning legal as well as political
victories. MORTON & KNOPFF, supra note 274.
299. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail To Change) the
Constitution, supra note 94, at 4-5.
300. Reva B. Siegel, The Jurisgenerative Role of Social Movements in United
States Constitutional Law (2004),
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/SELA%202004/SiegelPaperEnglishSELA2004.pdf;
Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools, & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331
(1995).
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to change ordinary law, whereas a supermajority is required to
change the Constitution. Appointments battles blur the line
between ordinary and constitutional politics. Maintaining that
distinction, however, is critical for the long-term viability of
democracy.301
Appointment battles not only erode the rigidity of the
Constitution but also undermine the ability of courts to
ameliorate political conflict. Courts lessen conflict because it is
universally understood that a neutral third party is the fairest
means for resolving disputes. 30 2 For courts to be able to reduce
social tensions, they must be perceived as fair and
independent. 303  There is a tension, however, between the
popular, social underpinnings of democracy and its formal
institutions. 30 4  The framers' hopes for an elite-centered
appointments process were frustrated by long-term
developments whereby citizens increasingly demanded a place
at the appointments table. If courts are seen as the pawns of
interest group struggles, however, the social trust they need to
ameliorate political conflict is eroded. Democracy, in short, can
erode institutions.
The American adherence to weak political controls over
constitutional review is deeply ingrained, but the die that was
cast in Philadelphia was more the result of historical accident
than any prolonged inquiry. Constitution-makers are not free to
remake the world anew, but are constrained by the operative
assumptions of the intellectual milieu within which they
operate.305 The intellectual assumption on which American
judicial review is built is a sharp distinction between law and
politics. This distinction provided the intellectual foundations of
Marbury v. Madison306 and continues to provide the grist for the
continuing fascination that constitutional scholars have for
301. The collapse of the distinction between constitutional and ordinary politics
led to dictatorship and oligarchy throughout much of Latin America's history.
Schor, supra note 36, at 3-7. Politicians quite naturally fear the alternation in
power that is necessary for democracy when elected officials have the power to
transform a nation's constitution readily. If constitutions can change with the
electoral cycle, the result is political polarization.
302. SHAPIRO, supra note 71, at 64-77.
303. THOMPSON, supra note 158, at 263.
304. See generally ZAKARIA, supra note 185.
305. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108
YALE L.J. 1225, 1303-04 (1999) (noting that constitution makers typically proceed by
using the tools and materials at hand rather than as engineers who seek to use the
best possible design).
306. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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Bickel's countermajoritarian mill. If what the courts do is law
and what legislatures do is politics, then maintaining the
distinction between these two spheres is critical if judicial
review is to be legitimate in a democracy.
The institutional counterpoint to the distinction between
law and politics that the framers uncritically assumed is the
weakness of democratic controls over the Supreme Court. It is
not surprising that elites whose lives spanned a transformation
from a monarchical and hierarchical society to a republican and
egalitarian one30 would fear the very changes they helped to
make.308  They feared that democracy would bring about
important social transformations and sought to hem these
changes in by fashioning a court free of democratic constraints
that would stand guard over what majorities could do.30 9
Lifetime tenure coupled with virtuous judges drawn from a
narrow circle would hopefully prevent future democratic
majorities from working their will.
It should not be surprising that other polities strengthened
the mechanisms of political accountability when they "borrowed"
judicial review from the United States. The framers could not
foresee the role that judicial review would play in American
politics. The continued American adherence to weak political
controls over judicial review owes more to path dependency than
to an ideological commitment to judicial supremacy in
constitutional interpretation. The democratic changes made to
judicial review in the process of legal transplantation in Europe
and in Canada are significant. These changes can best be
explained by the notion of political learning. Elites study and
learn from the legal and political experience of other nations.310
The rest of the world adopted stronger political controls over
their respective supreme courts because elites in those polities
understandably feared, fashioning a constitutional court that
would exercise the power of the American Supreme Court. No
nation adopting judicial review in the late twentieth century
could ignore the political dimensions of constitutional law. As a
consequence of this political learning, the nations of continental
Europe constructed a different appointments process that
makes it very difficult for minorities to place their partisans on
307. WOOD, supra note 98, at 5.
308. LESTER D. LANGLEY, THE AMERICAS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1750-1850
(1996).
309. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?, supra note 59.
310. HUNTINGTON, supra note 52.
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a nation's highest court. Canada made it unlikely that factions
would arise to seek to control its highest court by allowing for
the possibility of a legislative override. The European and
Canadian forms of judicial review, in short, sought to preserve a
stronger role for Parliament by creating stronger democratic
constraints on judicial review.
The problem in designing judicial review lies in how best to
create institutional mechanisms that enable citizens to exercise
control over the meaning of the constitution. As the following
table illustrates, American exceptionalism forces citizens to
utilize ex ante mechanisms of control, whereas other polities
structure judicial review to facilitate post facto control
mechanisms.
Table 1. Political Accountability
Post Facto
Ex Ante (Legislative override,
(Appointments) amendments)
Weak
Strong
Citizens in the United States have little choice but to
engage in appointments battles given the difficulty of amending
the Constitution. 11 Citizens in a polity with the European
model of judicial review, on the other hand, will be more likely
to seek constitutional change through amendment than through
the uncertain path of changing the membership of a
constitutional court. Canada falls in between the American and
European models of judicial review as citizens can influence
both appointments and seek a legislative override. Social
311. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 237 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (discussing the constitutional
amendment process).
Monocratic (Canada) United StatesMajoritarian (United (supermajority required
States) both in Congress and among
the states)
Europe (typically
Supermajoritarian supermajority required in(urpe) a Parliament) & Canada
(Europe) (majority for temporary
override)
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movements are more likely to seek an override than to seek to
change the membership of the Canadian Supreme Court,
however, given that appointments battles produce an uncertain
pay-off. Post facto mechanisms are superior to ex ante
mechanisms of popular control as they neither interfere with
judicial independence nor undermine constitutional rigidity.
Bickel and his interlocutors would have done well to have
considered comparatively how judicial review shapes the politics
of constitutional change. The countermajoritarian difficulty has
dominated constitutional theory in this country for over half a
century. The problem has had less purchase abroad because
constitutional courts are subject to greater political oversight
than they are in the United States. The experience of the
United States teaches us that courts can become a dangerous
branch if they lack efficacious mechanisms of democratic
control. The experience of Europe and Canada teaches us that
by ensuring that democratic majorities have some power over
either the make-up of constitutional courts or over their
decisions, courts do a better job of ameliorating political conflict.
In short, the countermajoritarian difficulty dissolves when
judicial review is democratized so that courts cannot be
counterconstitutional actors.
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